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"THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR IS
DISCRETION": SHOULD THE IRS CHANGE OR
SURRENDER ITS OVERSIGHT OF TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS?
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer*

Abstract
Recent events have highlighted the difficulties the InternalRevenue Service faces
when attempting to ensure that purportedly tax-exempt organizations in fact qualify for
that status. The problems in this area go much deeper than a group of IRS employees
subjecting certain organizations to greater scrutiny based on their political leanings,
however. For decades members of the public, the media, the academy, and Congress have
criticized the limited ability of the IRS to ensure that organizations claiming exemption
from federal income tax in fact deserve that categorization. Yet examples of IRS failings
in this area continue to arise with depressingfrequency. This is not surprisinggiven that
oversight of exempt organizations is but one of many areas that suffers from major
difficulties faced by the IRS as a whole, including shrinking resources, growing
responsibilities, and increasing responsibility for determinations that go beyond those
necessary for revenue collection. This Article draws on tax compliance literature to
explore how the currentlevel and methods of oversightfor exempt organizations could be
modified to improve compliance even given the existing resource constraints. It concludes
that while marginal improvements in oversight are possible, there is no silver bullet to
counter the IRS's growing inability to oversee this area. PartIV of this Article therefore
turns to more radicalproposals that would move the locus of oversightfor exempt and
particularlycharitable organizations out of the IRS. The proposal that shows the most
promise, but also is the most risky, would shift much of this role to a private, self-regulatory
body overseen by the IRS. Given the currentstate oflRS oversight, this proposaldeserves
serious consideration.

Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful to Kristin Hickman
for organizing the
University of Minnesota Law School Tax Policy symposium of which this Article is a part, to Paul Caron,
Chris Walker, the other symposium participants, and Philip Hackney for helpful comments, and to Erik
Adams and Kyle Chen for research assistance.
C 2016 Mayer. This is an open-access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits the user to copy,
distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original authors and source are credited.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent events have highlighted the difficulties the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
faces when attempting to ensure that purportedly tax-exempt organizations do in fact
qualify for that status.' These problems go much deeper than a group of IRS employees
subjecting certain organizations to greater scrutiny based on their political leanings. For
decades, members of the public, the media, the academy, and Congress have criticized the
limited ability of the IRS to ensure that organizations claiming exemption from federal
income tax in fact deserve that categorization. 2 Yet examples of IRS failings in this area
continue to arise with depressing frequency despite numerous suggestions for improvement
and various congressional and agency initiatives. 3 This is consistent with the major
difficulties faced by the IRS as a whole and discussed by other presenters at this
symposium. 4 As detailed in Part II of this Article, these difficulties have rendered the IRS
unable to keep pace with the growth of the exempt organizations sector over the past 40
years.
One of the latest such initiatives suggests a new approach, however. In 2014, the
IRS introduced the much shorter and simpler Form 1023-EZ application for nonprofit
organizations that claim exempt charitable status and expect to have only modest financial
resources, accompanied by faster procedures for handling all applications for recognition
of exemption.5 These innovations represent the first significant, permanent reduction in
the level of oversight the IRS provides in this area since the introduction of the Form 990EZ, a shorter version of the annual information return required for most exempt
organizations. 6 It is arguable, however, whether a reduction of oversight is in fact prudent
and whether other reductions might also be advisable. Part III of this Article draws on tax
compliance literature to explore how the current level and methods of oversight for exempt
organizations could be modified to improve compliance given existing resource
constraints. It concludes that while marginal improvements in oversight are possible, there
is no silver bullet to counter the IRS's growing inability to oversee this area.
Part IV of this Article therefore turns to more radical proposals that would move
the locus of oversight for exempt and particularly charitable organizations out of the IRS.
The proposal that shows the most promise, but also is the most risky, would shift much of
this role to a private, self-regulatory body overseen by the IRS. The current crisis, however,
highlights the need to pursue this proposal now.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRS OVERSIGHT

In theory, oversight of exempt organizations by the IRS and its predecessors is as
old as the Internal Revenue Code itself.7 In practice, there appears to have been little actual
oversight until Congress began requiring an annual information return for some exempt
1See S. REP. No. 114-119, at 60 (2015); Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and
Administrative Discretion, 42 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42-44, 49-51 (2013); Paul Caron, The IRS
Scandal, TAXPROF BLOG, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/irs-scandal [http://perma.cc/FS8W-7T8H].
2 See infra Part III.A.
4 See

Memorandum from J. Russell George, Inspector General, Dep't of the Treasury, to Jacob

Lew, Sec'y of the Treasury 1-2 (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/management/management
[https://perma.cc/WMP4-GXHG].
fy2015.pdf
5

501(C)(3)

See FORM 1023-EZ, STREAMLINED APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION
http://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-1023EZ [http://perma.cc

OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,

/23VW-QGJR].
6 See IRS Announcement 89-34, 1989-10 I.R.B. 30.
See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913).
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organizations effective as of 1943." Furthermore, Congress did not require that any
organizations apply to the IRS for recognition of their exempt status until it imposed this
requirement on many charitable organizations in 1969.9
This Part describes these two main channels for IRS oversight of exempt
organizations: consideration of applications for recognition of exemption and examinations
of annual information returns. It also reviews the other significant exempt organization
related activities engaged in by the IRS, such as providing various forms of guidance,
rulings, and technical advice, and the limited evidence regarding the current level of
compliance by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax laws. First, it is useful
to consider both the extent to which the size of the regulated community has grown over
time and the resources the IRS directs to overseeing this community, which have not kept
pace.
A.

Exempt Organizations and the IRS Exempt Organizations Division

The following two tables show the IRS-reported numbers and aggregate assets and
revenues for exempt organizations, both generally and specifically for charitable (I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)) organizations and the most numerous non-charitable organizations (I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations; I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) labor, agricultural, and
horticultural organizations; I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) business leagues, chambers of commerce,
and similar entities; I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) social and recreational clubs; and I.R.C. § 501(c)(8)
fraternal beneficiary organizations).

8See Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-285, § 117, 58 Stat. 21, 36-37 (1944); H.R. REP. No. 78871, at 24-25 (1943); S. REP. No. 78-627, at 21 (1943). The Treasury Department imposed an annual
information return requirement in 1942 on certain exempt organizations, effective for tax year 1941, although
it was not clear it had the authority to do so. See T.D. 5125, 1942-1 C.B. 101 (codified at Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.101-1), as modified by T.D. 5177, 1942-2 C.B. 123; MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 65 (2004).
9 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(a), 83 Stat. 487, 494-96 (1969) (codified
at I.R.C. § 508); H.R. REP. No. 91-431, pt. 1, at 37 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-552, at 53 (1969). Treasury by
regulation provided an application process before 1969, but it is not clear if Treasury sought to make this
process mandatory. See, e.g., T.D. 2693, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 293 (1918); T.D. 5125, 1942-1 C.B. 101
(codified at Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.101-1); Philip Hackney, Should the IRSNever "Target" Taxpayers?An
Examinationof the IRS Tea PartyAffair, 49 VAL. U. L. REv. 453, 460-61 (2015).

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

84

[
[Vol.7:80

Table 1: Exempt Organizations: Numbers"o
Fiscal
Year

All 501(c)s

501(c)(3)s

501(c)(4)-(8)s

Other 501(c)s

1980

846,433

319,842

453,415

73,176

1985

854,806

366,071

412,877

75,858

1990

1,022,214

489,882

443,066

89,266

1995

1,162,810

626,226

439,424

97,160

2000

1,354,395

819,008

431,965

103,422

2005

1,570,023

1,045,979

421,410

102,634

2010

1,821,824

1,280,739

437,581

103,504

2011

1,494,882

1,080,130

330,336

84,416

2012

1,484,818

1,081,891

320,029

82,898

2013

1,442,197

1,052,495

310,126

79,576

2014

1,568,454

1,117,941

369,416"

81,097

10 See IRS 1980 ANN. REP. 76; IRS 1986 ANN. REP. 60; IRS ANN. REP. 1990, at 38; IRS DATA BOOK
1995, at 25; IRS DATA BOOK 2000, at 24; IRS DATA BOOK 2005, at 40; IRS DATA BOOK 2010, at 56; IRS
DATA BOOK 2011, at 56; IRS DATA BOOK 2012, at 56; IRS DATA BOOK 2013, at 56; IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at
58.

1 The sharp increase from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2014 for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)-(8)
organizations is almost entirely attributable to a dramatic increase in the number of reported I.R.C.
§501(c)(4) organizations. Compare IRS DATA BOOK 2013, at 56 (91,056 such organizations), with IRS
DATA BOOK 2014, at 58 (148,585 such organizations). In response to an inquiry, the IRS stated its

preliminary conclusion is that this increase represents "entities that have applied for an [Employer
Identification Number] as an exempt organization (EO) but have not yet filed a Form 1023 or 1024 and

obtained an EO determination" (and so are not necessarily claiming exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)). Email from Emily Gross, IRS Statistics of Income Division (Aug. 31, 2015, 3:22 p.m. EDT) (on file with
author).
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Table 2: Exempt Organizations: Finances 1 2 (millions of dollars)
501(c)(3) Assets

Fiscal
Year

501(c)(4)-(8)
Assets

501(c)(3)
Revenues

501(c)(4)-(8)
Revenues

1995

1,143,079

159,344

663,371

81,415

2000

1,562,536

217,068

866,208

109,350

2005

2,241,887

282,862

1,252,889

153,688

2010

2,946,521

342,898

1,593,011

176,623

2011

3,030,133

359,926

1,647,905

179,300

The numbers reproduced in the first table above appear to exclude I.R.C. § 501(c)
organizations that are not required to apply for IRS recognition of their exempt status and
have not chosen to voluntarily do so.13 Organizations not required to apply include
churches, certain church-related entities, very small organizations (less than $5,000 in
annual gross receipts), and all non-501(c)(3) entities. 4 A study by the Urban Institute
estimates that churches currently number approximately 300,000 and very small
organizations number approximately 400,000.15 These figures also do not include several
other, relatively small in terms of numbers and financial resources, types of exempt
organizations that fell within the jurisdiction of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division
during some or all of this period, nor do they include a small subset of taxable entities
(primarily non-exempt trusts) that also fell within that division's jurisdiction during this
period.' 6
Similarly, the financial figures do not include organizations that are not required
to file annual information returns, including churches, certain church-related entities, and
organizations with annual gross receipts below certain thresholds (which thresholds have
varied over time).' 7 The financial figures for I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations also do not
include financial information for private foundations, which the IRS reports separately.
Those figures also reflect a growth in numbers and financial resources over the same time

Cecelia Hilgert & Melissa Whitten, Charitiesand Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 1995, STAT.
INC. BULL. 105, 123-25 (Winter 1998-1999); Paul Amsberger, Charitiesand Other Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 2000, STAT. INC. BULL. 122, 134-36 (Fall 2003); Paul Amsberger, Charities, Labor and
Agricultural, and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2005, STAT. INC. BULL. 271, 281-82 (Fall 2008); Paul
Arnsberger, Nonprofit CharitableOrganizations, 2010, STAT. INC. BULL. 74, 85, 87 (Winter 2014); Paul
Arnsberger, Nonprofit CharitableOrganizations, 2011, STAT. INC. BULL. 1, 10, 12 (Spring 2015) [hereinafter
Charitable Organizations2011]. These sources rely on a sample of annual information returns for each
fiscal year. See, e.g., CharitableOrganizations2011, at 4.
13 See IRS DATA BOOK 2014,
at 58 n.1.
14 See I.R.C. § 6033(c)(1)
(2014).
12

15

See KATIE L. ROEGER ET AL., THE NONPROFIT

ALMANAC

2012, at 2 n.1 (2012).

For example, as of fiscal year 2014 there were 222 I.R.C. § 501(d) religious and apostolic
associations, 29,462 I.R.C. § 527 political organizations, and 125,177 non-exempt trusts also within the
division's jurisdiction. IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 56-58.
17
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-56 IT, TAx-EXEMPT SECTOR: GOVERNANCE,
16

TRANSPARENCY, AND OVERSIGHT ARE CRITICAL TO MAINTAINING PUBLIC TRUST

2005

REPORT].

7 (2005) [hereinafter GAO
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period, although revenues and to a lesser extent assets have varied more.' In 2012, the
latest year reported by the IRS, private foundations had assets worth approximately $633
billion and total annual revenue of approximately $95 billion.19
The growth in the number and financial resources of exempt organizations follows
a trend that dates back to at least 1975 and likely earlier. 2 0 The decline in the number of
organizations (but not the reported financial resources) after fiscal year 2010 is primarily
the result of Congress automatically revoking the exempt status of organizations that failed
to file three consecutive required annual information returns after 2006.21 While some of
those organizations were active, most of them likely had ceased operations and so did not
*
22
represent a significant amount of activities, assets, or revenues.
As for IRS resources dedicated to overseeing exempt organizations, the IRS does
not release separate budget figures for its Exempt Organizations Division.23 In recent
years, however, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided information
about the number of employees within this division.

1s

See Cynthia Belmonte, Domestic Private Foundationsand Related Excise Taxes, Tax Year 2009,

STAT. INC. BULL. 114, 115 (Winter 2013); Melissa Ludlum, Domestic Private Foundations, Tax Years 19932002, STAT. INC. BULL. 162, 163 (Fall 2005).
19 IRS, SOI TAX STATS - DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATION AND CHARITABLE TRUST STATISTICS,

http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Domestic-Private-Foundation-and-Charitable-Trust-Statistics [http://
perma.cc/MC8F-YQDG] (see Statistical Tables, Domestic Private Foundations: Number and Selected
Financial Data, Tax Year 2012, cells X1I & DI).
20 See Alicia Meckstroth & Paul Amsberger, A 20-Year Review of the Nonprofit Sector, 1975-1995,
STAT. INC. BULL. 149, 151, 153 (Fall 1998).
21 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFF., GAO-i 5-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER
COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2014) [hereinafter GAO 2014 EO REP.].
22 See Amy S. Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Revoked A Snapshot of OrganizationsThat Lost
Their Tax-Exempt Status, URBAN INSTITUTE, at 2 (Aug. 2011), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files

/alfresco/publication-pdfs/4123 86-Revoked-A-Snapshot-of-Organizations-that-Lost-their-Tax-Exempt-Status
.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5S4-KC72]; Linda M. Lampkin, Automatic Revocation ofNonprofits' Tax-Exempt
Status: What Nonprofits, Grantmakers, andDonorsNeed to Know 3 (July 27, 2010), https://www.guidestar
.org/ViewCmsFile.aspx?ContentlD=2947 [https://perma.cc/Q9N6-8JYX].
23

The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has on occasion obtained these figures, however.

See, e.g.,

STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-3-00, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS
RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 120 (2000)

[hereinafter JCT 2000 REPORT].
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Table 3: IRS Exempt Organizations Division Employees 24 (full-time equivalents)
Fiscal
Year

Total

2000

798

2005

Examinations

Determinations/Rulings
& Agreements

Education
Outreach & Other

424

342

32

856

467

347

42

2010

889

529

341

19

2011

886

534

328

24

2012

858

516

319

23

2013

842

493

326

23

Tota

Exainatons25

'

Looking further into the past, for fiscal year 1975 the IRS reported devoting an
average of 495 field professional positions to the examination of exempt organization
26
returns.26 While this earlier figure is not directly comparable to the figures from recent
years, it suggests that the number of employees dedicated to examinations in fiscal year
2013 is about the same as almost 40 years earlier.27 For fiscal year 1975 the IRS reported
658 average positions, with 666 employees at the end of the year, indicating that the
Exempt Organization Division in fiscal year 2013 had about 20 percent more employees
total than 38 years earlier. 28 The reliability of this figure is unclear, however, as a 1977
report stated that "[a]bout 1,000 IRS employees administer the exempt organization
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code," or about 160 more employees than do so today.29
Regardless of the exact figures, however, during approximately the same time period the
number of organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c) has almost doubled and the financial
resources controlled by the most common organizations has increased by 50 percent or
more over just the fourteen years from 1995 to 2011 (adjusting for inflation).30 And both
the applicable law and the main forms filed by exempt organizations have increased in
complexity and length, as detailed later in this Part.3
The IRS employees dedicated to exempt organization matters do not operate in a
vacuum. Rather, they enjoy significant support from other parts of the IRS and the federal
government. These other parts include: service center, technology, other support, and
appeals staff within the IRS; Chief Counsel staff and other Treasury employees who help
GAO 2014 EO REP., supra note 21, at 20; GAO 2005 REPORT, supra note 17, at 41; see also JCT
supra note 23, at 60 (862 and 946 total EO staff in fiscal years 1990 and 1995, respectively).
25 The figures for 2000 and 2005 are for "Determinations" while the figures
for later years are for
"Rulings & Agreements," a broader function that included determinations.
26 COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANN. REP.
1975, at 41.
27
24

2000

REPORT,

See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-02-526, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:

IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 23 (2002) [hereinafter GAO

2002 REPORT] (IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities staffing remained essentially flat from 1974 to

1997).

See COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 26, at 147.
David Ginsburg et al., Federal Oversight ofPrivate Philanthropy,in 5 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2578, 2581 (1977).
30 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation
calculator.htm [http://perma.cc/R9WB-ASNC] (used to adjust 1995 figures to 2011 dollars); supra notes 10,
12 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 48-50, 60-62 and accompanying
text.
28

29

[
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with exempt organizations matters; and attorneys within the Department of Justice's Tax
Division who litigate certain disputes with exempt organizations.3 2 Information regarding
how the availability of these other supports has varied over time is not readily available,
however.
B.

Applications for Recognition of Exemption

For fiscal year 1970, the IRS reported receiving 23,349 applications and issuing
17,367 determination letters, representing a steady increase in both applications and
determination letters from the comparable figures four years earlier (17,361 and 14,394,
respectively). 33 For fiscal year 1980 the IRS reported having processed 49,534
applications, with 36,980 approved, 1,914 denied, and 10,640 withdrawn or otherwise
disposed of without a determination. 34 The following table shows more detailed
information that the IRS has made available in recent years regarding the applications that
it closed.
Table 4: Applications Closed 3 5
Fiscal
Year

Charitable (501(c)(3))

Other 501(c)

Total

Approved

Denied

Other

Total

Approved

Denied

Other

1995

56,408

42,324

377

13,707

10,866

8,289

242

2,355

2000

74,534

61,005

456

13,073

8,120

6,229

26

1,865

2005

77,539

63,402

765

13,372

6,029

4,801

16

1,212

2010

59,945

48,934

500

10,511

5,600

4,726

13

628

2011

55,319

49,677

205

5,437

5,656

5,016

10

609

2012

51,748

45,029

123

6,596

9,027

7,547

20

1,127

2013

45,289

37,946

79

7,264

7,750

6,162

9

1,116

2014

100,032

94,365

67

5,600

17,493

16,289

22

1,182

Other resolutions include applications withdrawn by the organization, applications
that did not provide required information or were otherwise incomplete, or applications on

32

See IRS, TODAY'S IRS

perma.cc/4VMW-PG5M]; U.S.

ORGANIZATION, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Today's-IRS-Organization [http://

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX

POLICY, http://www.treasury.gov/about

/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Tax-Policy.aspx [http://perma.cc/7KD4-3VNM]; U.S.
OF JUSTICE, TAX DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/tax [http://perma.cc/X699-HN6V].
33 COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 1970 ANN. REP. 26.
34 IRS 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 76.
35 See IRS DATA BOOK 1995, at 25; IRS DATA BOOK 2000,
DATA BOOK 2010, at 55; IRS DATA BOOK
55; IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 57.

2011, at 55; IRS

DEPARTMENT

at 23; IRS DATA BOOK 2005, at 39; IRS
2012, at 55; IRS DATA BOOK 2013, at

DATA BOOK
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which the IRS refused to rule.36 Data from the 1990s indicates that during the decade more
than two-thirds of other resolutions were for failure to establish exemption.3 7
The IRS does not generally release the number of applications it receives each
fiscal year. In 2012 congressional testimony, however, a senior IRS official reported that
the IRS receives approximately 60,000 applications annually, of which more than 50,000
are for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).38 This latter figure is similar to an Urban
Institute estimate of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) applications for the period from 2001 through 2011
of between approximately 45,000 to slightly over 50,000 per year.3 9 The reason why the
number of closed I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) applications is so much higher than that figure in 2000
and 2005 is apparently because before 2009 the IRS included in the closed applications
figure private foundation status rulings that many applicants routinely received five years
after their initial application; these closed "foundation follow-up cases" averaged over
19,000 annually from 2001 to 2008.40 Closed cases also reflect some other types of
determinations, but based on the apparent number of applications those other
determinations are probably relatively rare.
In recent years, however, the IRS has seen a sharp increase in applications due to
organizations seeking reinstatement after automatic revocations began in 2011.42 When
the Department of the Treasury submitted the new Form 1023-EZ and revised Form 1023
to the Office of Management and Budget for review in 2014, it stated that annually there
are approximately 80,000 applications for recognition under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) alone,
which presumably included requests for reinstatement.4 3
Therefore, the decline in the number of applications processed from 2010 to 2013
reflects not a reduction in the number of applications submitted but rather an increased
backlog of pending applications, including requests for reinstatement.4 4 This backlog
reached more than 60,000, which at the then current processing pace would have taken the
IRS more than a year to clear. 5 Using the streamlined procedures and application form
36

See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 57 n.2.

37 See STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO
CHARITABLE AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION REGARDING GROWTH AND
OVERSIGHT OF THE TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR 41 (2004).
38 Public Charity OrganizationalIssues, UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax, and the Revised Form

990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversightof the H. Comm. on Ways andMeans, 112th Cong. 5, 8
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 Hearings] (statement of Steven T. Miller, Deputy Commissioner of Services and
Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service).
39 Amy S. Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Applicationsfor 501 (c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status Declining:
Recession or Rule Change?, URBAN INSTITUTE, at 2 (2013), http://www.urban.org/research/publication
/applications-50 1c3 -tax-exempt-status-declining-recession-or-rule-change [http://perma.cc/2PTH-LDQJ].
40
Id. at 1-2.
41 See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 57 n.1.
42 See Eric B. Carriker et al., Exempt Organizations:Leveraging Limited
IRS Resources in the Tax
Administration ofSmall Tax-Exempt Organizations,in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOV'T
ENTITIES, 2013 REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 10; 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2012 ANN. REP. TO
CONGRESS 194, 196.
43 See Submission for OMB Review: Comment Request, 79 Fed. Reg. 18124, 18125 (Mar. 31,

2014).

44

See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE
RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 27 (2013); supra note 42.
45 See Press Release, IRS, New 1023-EZ Form Makes Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status
Easier; Most Charities Qualify (July 1, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/New-1023-EZ-FormMakes-Applying-for-501c3Tax-Exempt-Status-Easier-Most-Charities-Qualify [http://perma.cc/RB29-

Q8GV].
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described in Part III.C.1 below, in fiscal year 2014 the IRS more than doubled the number
of applications closed. At the same time, however, the proportion of applications denied
or resolved by means other than approval or denial dropped significantly (from 0.17% to
0.08% and from 15.8% to 5.8%, respectively).

Over time, the application forms have become lengthier and more complex. For
example, the Form 1023 for organizations seeking recognition of exemption under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) has grown from four pages when it was first introduced in the early 1950s to
twelve pages, plus fourteen pages of schedules that apply to certain types of
organizations.4 " The counterpart form for organizations seeking recognition of exemption
under other provisions of I.R.C. § 501(c) has grown from two pages in the early 1960s to
six pages, plus thirteen pages of schedules that apply to certain types of organizations. 4 9
At least part of this growth is attributable to the increasing complexity of the statutes and
other federal tax rules governing exemption.50
C.
Annual Information Returns and Examinations
As noted above, Congress did not generally require exempt organizations to file
annual information returns until 1944.51 Even then, there were apparently no examinations
of such returns before 1954 unless the IRS received a complaint.52 The IRS examined the
returns of 13,000 exempt organizations in 1966 but only the returns of 8,500 organizations
in 1970. 53 This decline was part of the impetus for IRS to create the Exempt Organization
Examination Branch in 1970 and to implement other structural changes to increase its
capacity for overseeing exempt organizations. Examinations appear to have peaked in
fiscal year 1973, when the IRS examined the returns of almost 19,000 organizations; close
to 15,000 of these organizations were private foundations, as required to fulfill a
commitment by the then IRS Commissioner to examine all private foundations within five
years of the new rules imposed on them by Congress in 1969.54 The following table shows
the examination information reported by the IRS for more recent years.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47 See id.
48 Karen A. Gries et al., Exempt Organizations:Form 1023 - UpdatingItfor the
Future, in
46

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND Gov'T ENTITIES, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS

6 (2012); see

also IRS Form 1023 (revised Dec. 2013).
49 See IRS Form 1024 (revised Sept. 1998); IRS Form 1024 (revised June 1962), http://texashistory
.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth250819/ml/l/ [http://perma.cc/E8TH-MGAR].
50 See Nicole S. Dandridge, Choking Out Local Community Service Organizations:Rising Federal
Tax Regulation andIts Impact on Small Nonprofit Entities, 99 Ky. L.J. 695, 708 (2011).
51 Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52 Ginsburg et al., supra note 29,
at 2584.
53 Id. at 2584-85; see also COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE 1970 ANN. REP. 24-26.
54
Id. at 2610.
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Table 5: Exempt Organization Returns Examined5 5

PercentOte
All Annual
Returns Filed

Form
990990-EZs
Examined

Other Annual
Returnsu
Examined

1995

523,191

3,852

2000

719,928

2005

Fiscal
Year

Annual

Rer

Returns
Examined

Examined

380

0.8%

6,265

3,630

200

0.5%

3,605

849,342

2,402

362

0.3%

2,189

2010

776,300

3,596

329

0.5%

7,524

2011

858,865

2,962

240

0.4%

8,849

2012

798,903

2,918

125

0.4%

7,700

2013

771,675

2,774

138

0.4%

7,693

2014

765,395

2,579

246

0.4%

5,259

Annual returns include Form 990, Form 990-EZ, Form 990-PF (for private
foundations), Form 1041-A (relating to certain trusts), Form 1 120-POL (relating to certain
political organizations), and Form 5227 (also relating to certain trusts).5 6 In contrast, other
returns are returns that exempt organizations normally file in addition to its annual
information return, such as Form 990-T (unrelated business income tax).
The number of annual returns examined does not necessarily equal the number of
organizations that had their annual returns examined, as the IRS might choose to examine
returns from multiple years for a single organization.5" Also, while the percentage
provided is based on the number of annual returns examined in a given fiscal year
compared to the number of annual returns filed during the calendar year ending in that
fiscal year, it only provides a rough estimate of examination coverage because the returns
examined in a given fiscal year were usually filed in earlier years.59
As with the application form, the annual information returns have also generally
grown longer and more complex over time, where the number of pages acts as a rough
measure of their length and complexity. Occurring in 2007, the most recent major revision
of the Form 990 resulted in a form with eleven pages that all filers must complete and
sixteen schedules that certain organizations may also need to complete (and since then the

55

See IRSDATABOOK 1995, at 14, 33; IRS DATA BOOK 2000, at 20; IRS DATA BOOK 2005, at 3233; IRS DATA BOOK 2010, at 33; IRS DATABOOK 2011, at 33; IRS DATA BOOK 2012, at 33; IRS DATABOOK
2013, at 33; IRS DATABOOK 2014, at 34.
56 See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 34 n. 1.

e.g., id. at 34.
See GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note 27, at 22; Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An

57See,

58

Alternative Approach 2 n.2 (2013), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedoracontent

/download/ac:168629/CONTENT/Owens_-_CharityOversight
.cc/6R9M-ZE2X].
5

Owens, supra note 58, at 2 n.2.

An AlternativeApproach.pdf [http://perma
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main form has grown to twelve pages).60 By comparison, the form was only a single page
long in 1968, and before the 2007 revision, it was only nine pages long with two possible
schedules (including a seven-page schedule applicable to most I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
organizations). 6 1 A significant part of the most recent growth in the length of the form
appears to have been driven by the IRS's addition of numerous inquiries relating to
62
governance issues.
There are several important additional caveats to this return and examination
information. First, churches (of all faiths) and certain church-related entities are exempt
from the annual return requirements. 63 While the IRS can still examine a church, the
existence of special statutory protections for churches and, in recent years, questions about
the proper implementation of those protections have made examinations of churches very
rare.
Second, there are financial filing thresholds for the Form 990 and, after it was
introduced in 1989, the Form 990-EZ. 5 The threshold for most exempt organizations
having to file the Form 990-EZ is having annual gross receipts of more than $50,000.66
While the financial filing thresholds have varied over time, their existence means that many
smaller exempt organizations had not been required to file annual information returns
before Congress imposed that requirement on all exempt organizations (except churches
and certain church-related entities) in 2006. For these smaller organizations, the IRS now
requires the online Form 990-N, which only asks for eight items of information.6 " In fiscal
year 2014, the IRS received 470,895 of these Forms 990-N. 6 9 The IRS does not appear to
release any information regarding the number of examinations involving the Form 990-N,
but it has procedures in place for such examinations and has recently stated that it instituted

See IRS, Overview of Form 990 Redesign for Tax Year 2008 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/overviewform 990_redesign.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HKV-UBMA]; IRS, Form 990 (2014), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHD2-HJLM].
61 See IRS Form 990 (1968), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990shf--1968.pdf
[http://perma.cc
/KU5W-8FAL] (for exempt organizations other than those exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); IRS, Form 990A (1968), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990asf--1968.pdf [http://perma.cc/CST5-5U9R] (for
organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); IRS, Form 990 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior
/f990--2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/22W5-ESHL]; IRS, 2007, Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, at 5
(2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i990-ez--2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EEF-9GGA]; IRS, Schedule A,
Form 990 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990sa--2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/V48K-H2XX].
62 See Rummana Alam, Note, Not What the Doctors Ordered: Nonprofit Hospitals and the New
Corporate GovernanceRequirements ofthe Form 990, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 229, 240.
63 Supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
64 See I.R.C. § 7611 (2014); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1, 74 Fed. Reg.
39003 (Aug 5, 2009);
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15 -514, IRS EXAMINATION SELECTION: INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR
EXEMPT ORGANIZATION SELECTION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 25-26 (2015) [hereinafter GAO 2015 REP.].
65 See Service ConsideringImprovements to Collection of UBIT Information,
42 TAX NOTES 1053
(1989).
66 IRS, 2014 Instructions for Form 990-EZ, at 4 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990ez.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EX7H-VG3W].
67 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 1223, 120
Stat. 780, 1090 (2006)
(codified at I.R.C. § 6033(i)); IRS, ANNUAL ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENT FOR SMALL EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS - FORM 990-N (E-POSTCARD), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/AnnualElectronic-Filing-Requirement-for-Small-Exempt-Organizations-Form-990-N-%28e-Postcard%29 [http://
perma.cc/BW6D-VTVK] [hereinafter IRS FORM 990-NWEBSITE] (last updated April 21, 2015).
68 IRS FORM 990-N WEBSITE, supra note
67.
69 IRS DATA BOOK, 2014, at
34 n.1.
60
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compliance checks on hundreds of organizations that had filed the form since they appeared
to be ineligible to do so. 70
D.
Guidance, Rulings, Technical Advice and Other Activities
The IRS also provides precedential guidance in a variety of forms, responds to
taxpayers' formal requests for rulings, issues technical advice in response to requests made
either by IRS employees or by organizations during the course of examinations, and
responds to other correspondence both from the public and from members of Congress.
Table 6: Other Activities

71

Fiscal
Year

Guidance

Technical Advice
and Assistance

Closed Ruling
Requests from
Taxpayers

Correspondence

2000

10

26

2,182

595

2005

7

22

1,664

501

2010

7

33

400

525

2011

18

27

390

607

2012

15

37

357

702

2013

8

24

566

810

2014

16

33

724

735

Guidance is defined as regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices,
announcements, and information/news releases. 72 Annual IRS reports from earlier years
show a significantly higher number of regulations, revenue rulings, and revenue procedures
issued through the early 1980s, peaking at 84 in fiscal year 1977 (the annual reports did
not consistently provide figures for other types of guidance). 73 The sharp decline in such
guidance, particularly revenue rulings and procedures, coincided with the controversy that
erupted over the IRS's handling of private schools with racial discriminatory policies,
which culminated in the Bob Jones University Supreme Court case. One critical part of
the controversy was a revenue procedure that Congress so disfavored that it passed
legislation preventing the IRS from spending any funds to enforce it. This may have led
the Treasury and the IRS to shy away from issuing guidance more generally with respect
See id. at 34; IRM 4.75.15.6(2), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-075-015.html [http://perma
.cc/9MNW-EQ3H]; IRS EXEMPT ORG., FY 2012 ANN. REP. &FY 2013 WORKPLAN 20 (2012), http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-tege/FY2012_EOAnnualRpt 2013 Work Plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZA7R-ASTK] [hereinafter
EO 2012 ANN. REP.].
71 See IRS DATA BOOK, 2000, at 22; IRS DATA BOOK, 2005, at 37; IRS DATA BOOK, 2010, at 53;
IRS DATABOOK, 2011, at 53; IRS DATABOOK, 2012, at 53; IRS DATABOOK, 2013, at 53; IRS DATABOOK,
2014, at 55.
72 See, e.g., IRS DATABOOK, 2014, at 55 n.1.
73 See 1975 IRS. ANN. REP. 45; 1976 IRS ANN. REP. 45; 1977 IRS ANN. REP. 37; 1978 IRS ANN.
REP. 33; 1979 IRS ANN. REP. 25; 1980 IRS ANN. REP. 33; 1981 IRS ANN. REP. 20; 1982 IRS ANN. REP. 17;
1983 IRS ANN. REP. 17; 1984 IRS ANN. REP. 20.
74 See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
70

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

94

[
[Vol.7:80

to exempt organizations. 75 Beginning at that time, there was also a general decline in
revenue rulings, possibly driven by an increasing IRS priority on resolving open cases more
swiftly. 76
Technical advice and assistance refers to written responses to internal requests for
legal guidance from IRS employers.
Such technical advice and assistance similarly
peaked in the mid-1980s at slightly over 400 annually, and closed ruling requests from
taxpayers peaked at close to 6,000 at the same time.78 The reason for the sharp decline in
later years is not clear, although again there was a general decline in such guidance that
began in the 1980s, possibly driven by the increasing IRS priority on resolving open cases
more swiftly and without having to issue publicly available (even in redacted form)
documents. 79 The IRS had also begun to take steps that discouraged requests for private
letter rulings, including imposing (and then significantly increasing) a fee for such rulings,
making more areas off limits for such rulings, and adopting streamlined procedures for
some common rulings. s
The fact that the amount of both precedential and nonprecedential guidance declined generally over the past several decades makes it unlikely
that the recent shift in responsibility for guidance relating to exempt organizations from the
IRS to the Office of Chief Counsel will cause a resurgence.
Finally, the IRS also engages in public education in a variety of ways, including
maintaining an extensive website of exempt organization information, drafting and
revising publications as needed, hosting various workshops for the public and practitioners,
and communicating with the regulated community in numerous ways. 82 However, the
Service has discontinued some forms of public education in recent years, most notably the
internal but publicly available articles published as part of the Exempt Organizations
Continuing Professional Education Technical Instruction Program.83
E.

Current Compliance

Despite these trends, it is not clear to what extent this reduced IRS oversight has
led to increased violations of the applicable federal tax laws by exempt organizations.
Information regarding such violations, and related violations of applicable state and local

7 See Olatunde C. Johnson, The Story ofBob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion,
and Congress'Extraordinary
Acquiescence, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 126, 137-38 (William

Eskridge & Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2010).
76 See Marion Marshall et al., The Changing Landscape ofIRS Guidance:A Downward Slope, 90
TAX NOTES 673, 673 (2001).
IRM 7.1.2.3.1, 7.1.2.3.2, http://www.irs.gov/inn/part7/irm_07-001-002.html [http://perma.cc
/25V6-YSPL].
78 See 1982 IRS ANN. REP. 59; 1983 IRS ANN. REP. 63; 1984 IRS ANN. REP. 63; IRS, HIGHLIGHTS
OF 1985, at 7; 1986 IRS ANN. REP. 59; 1987 IRS ANN. REP. 58; 1988 IRS ANN. REP. 56.
7 See Marshall et al., supra note 76, at 673-74.
80 See id. at 674; Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 1, 80 (setting user fees); IRS, Form 8940

Miscellaneous Determination Requests, https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/New-Form-8940-forMiscellaneous-Determination-Requests [https://perma.cc/SVG5-EJJJ] (last updated Aug. 28, 2015).
8I IRS Announcement 2014-34, 2014-51 I.R.B. 949; see also Matthew R. Madara, Realignment of
EO Rulings Will Bring New Work Rules, 146 TAX NOTES 1215 (2015).
82 See IRS TAX INFORMATION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER NON-PROFITS, http://www.irs.gov
/Charities-&-Non-Profits [http://perma.cc/M3RF-WN3T] (last updated Oct. 16, 2015); Carriker, supra note
42, at 9-10.

83 See IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION ARTICLES, http://www
.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Continuing-Professional-Education-Technical-

Instruction-Program [http://perma.cc/VGC3-XN8N] (last updated May 1, 2015); Kim Barker & Justin Elliott,
How The IRS's Nonprofit Division Got So Dysfunctional, PROPUBLICA (May 17, 2013).
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laws, is almost completely anecdotal. 84 The IRS estimated a voluntary payment
compliance rate for all tax-exempt and government entities in tax year 2001 of 99.87%, the
highest rate among the four IRS operating divisions.' It is not clear how reliable or how
reflective of actual compliance that figure is, given that violations of the requirements for
exemption rarely result in revocation. 86
At the same time, some instances of
noncompliance may not be related to the federal tax law requirements for exemption, such
as failures to comply with employment tax rules. 7
The IRS has attempted to gather more data specifically about compliance with the
requirements for exemption within certain subsets of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations
through various projects. Most of those projects have found a relatively limited and minor
incidence of noncompliance. For example, the Colleges and Universities Compliance
Project resulted in less than 10 percent of colleges and universities surveyed being selected
for examination, with examinations uncovering various unrelated business income tax,
compensation-setting procedure, and employment tax issues, but no issues that apparently
rose to the level that would justify revocation of exempt status." Similarly, the Hospital
Compliance Project did not report any significant compliance issues based on
questionnaires received from almost 500 hospitals and led to compensation-focused
examinations of only 20 of those hospitals.89 While the Political Activities Compliance
Initiative led to examinations of over 250 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations for alleged
prohibited political activity, which was substantiated in over half the examinations, the IRS
apparently found most violations minor or inadvertent enough that it resolved almost all
with only a warning. 90 The one notable exception is the Credit Counseling Compliance
Project, which resulted in revocation of exempt status, completed or proposed, for all 41
completed examinations.9 ' But even before this project, credit-counseling organizations
only represented a tiny proportion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations. 9 2
There are nevertheless some indications that at least minor noncompliance may be
relatively widespread in the larger exempt organizations universe. For example, a recent
project focusing on large private foundations resulted in additional taxes or penalties in
84 See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Charityin the 21st Century: Trending TowardDecay, 11 FLA. TAX

REV. 1, 19-20 (2011); Marion Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers andDirectors of
Charities:A Survey ofPress Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (2003); Mark Sidel, The
GuardiansGuardingThemselves: A ComparativePerspective on Nonprofit Self-Regulation, 80 CHI. -KENT L.
REV. 803, 804-07 (2005).
85 IRS, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 16
(2007).
86 See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: PublicDisclosure as a
Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 219 & n.139 (2012).
87 See Memorandum from J. Russell George to Jacob Lew, supra
note 4, at 7-8.
88 IRS COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES COMPLIANCE PROJECT FINAL REP. 2-6 (2013), http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-tege/CUCP FinalRpt 0425 13 .pdf [http://perma.cc/6SK7-Q3WQ] [hereinafter UNIVERSITIES
REP.].
8 IRS EXEMPT ORG., HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE PROJECT FINAL

REP. 1-5 (2014), http://www.irs.gov

/pub/irs-tege/frepthospproj.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QZH-6AMS] [hereinafter HOSPITAL REP.].
90 IRS EXEMPT ORG., 2011 WORK PLAN 19-21 (2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fy20lleo
workplan.pdf [http://perma.cc/4V3A-TQ8B]. The limited information available on a related sub-project
involving political contributions also indicates the IRS resolved almost all confirmed violations with a written
warning. See IRS, 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 6-7 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub
/irs-tege/2006paci report_5-30-07.pdf [http://perma.cc/2R3D-BTAS].
91 IRS, CREDIT COUNSELING COMPLIANCE PROJECT 3 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cc
report.pdf92 [http://perma.cc/CZF4-UPZY].
d. at 1.
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almost half of the closed examinations, although apparently no revocations as of the last
report from the IRS. 93 And an IRS review of several thousand organizations in the middle
of the last decade resulted in 22 percent being referred for examination, including 15
percent of recently established organizations. 94 Scholars also have identified significant
accuracy problems with the annual information returns (the Form 990 series) filed by
exempt organizations. 95 However, many of the inaccuracies appear to stem from arithmetic
and other inadvertent errors or from efforts to present the organization in a better light to
donors and other potential supporters, rather than representing efforts to hide violations of
the federal tax laws. 96
This limited information has left scholars and other commentators to extrapolate
(i.e., guess) the extent to which known violations are reflected in the wider exempt
organization sector and, for obvious reasons, these extrapolations vary widely. 9 7 It appears,
however, that the vast majority of exempt organizations seek to comply with the applicable
federal tax laws, with only a small subset of organizations and their leaders being engaged
in intentional and significant violations (as apparently frequently occurred in the credit
counseling area). But even inadvertent violations are still a concern, especially since
exempt organizations, particularly charities, risk a significant loss in public confidence and
support from even a relatively low level of noncompliance. 98 The challenge for the IRS is
therefore to help the apparently vast majority of exempt organizations that desire to comply
with the applicable tax laws to do so, while at the same time identifying and addressing the
relatively small pockets of intentional and significant noncompliance, even as the Service's
resources fail to keep pace with the size and complexity of both the exempt organizations
community and the applicable law.
III.
MODIFYING OVERSIGHT
This Part first briefly reviews the concerns raised by commentators regarding IRS
oversight of exempt organizations and related proposals for improving that oversight. It
then considers whether there are currently promising candidates for improving oversight
in light of the resource constraints the IRS faces, drawing on the extensive literature
addressing tax law compliance more generally. This consideration includes describing the
93 EO 2012 ANN. REP., supra note 70, at 19.
94 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND IMPROVED CASE
TRACKING WOULD HELP THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION BETTER ALLOCATE RESOURCES
[hereinafter TIGTA 2008 REP.].

4 (2008)

9 See Carolyn Cordery, Light-Handed CharityRegulation: Its Effect on Reporting Practicein New
Zealand 6-7 (Working Paper No. 83, 2011), http://papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2028666
[http://perma.cc/58EP-MQZ7] (summarizing this research).
96 See GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note 27, at 9-13; Elizabeth K. Keating & Peter Frumkin,
ReengineeringNonprofit FinancialAccountability: Toward a More Reliable Foundationfor Regulation, 63
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 7 (2003); see also Jeffrey J. Burks, Accounting Errorsin Nonprofit Organizations, 29
ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 341, 350, 360-61 (2015) (finding a relatively high rate of accounting errors among

public charities as compared to U.S. publicly traded companies but no evidence of intentional manipulations,
and also finding indications that financial audits of public charities are relatively rigorous and independent).
9 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 84, at 19-20; Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, supra note 84, at 25;
Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the CharitableSector Through a FederalCharity
Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3-5 (2009); Peter Swords, The Form 990As An
Accountability Tool For 501 (c) (3) Nonprofits, 51 TAx LAW. 571, 573-74 (1998).

9See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE,
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 21 (2005) [hereinafter PANEL FINAL REP.]; PAUL C. LIGHT, How AMERICANS VIEW CHARITIES: A
REPORT ON CHARITABLE CONFIDENCE, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/04/nonprofits-

light [http://perma.cc/B2ER-CDVG]; Swords, supra note 97, at 573-74.
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recent IRS initiatives to reduce oversight at the application stage and discussing how best
to evaluate the effects of such changes.
A.
Concerns and Proposals
Concerns about the effectiveness of IRS oversight for exempt organizations are
not new, as illustrated by the following passage from a 1977 report prepared under the
auspices of the blue-ribbon Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs:
Recently the Service has acknowledged that in the exempt
organizations area it fulfills a regulator rather than tax-collecting role.
While troubled by the breadth of its responsibility in this area, in which
the Service admits that "the tax collector has never been entirely
comfortable," those within the Service who specialize in exempt
organizations . . . take this responsibility seriously and attempt to meet it
fairly. In doing so, these officials are somewhat handicapped by (a)
cumbersome procedures which were designed generally to meet the needs
of the tax-collecting branches of the Service; (b) inadequate authority in
relation to other officials near the top of the Service's hierarchy; (c) the
understandable emphasis of the Service on its role as tax collector rather
than as overseer of a non-revenue-producing activity; and (d) the generally
weaker qualifications and training of the Service's field staff as compared
with the National Office staff.99
More recently, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector-organized in response to
concerns raised by Congress with respect to IRS oversight of charities-stated that
"[f]unding for federal and state oversight of tax-exempt organizations has become
increasingly inadequate as the size and complexity of the exempt sector has grown." 00
The National Taxpayer Advocate's 2014 Annual Report to Congress noted that Taxpayer
Advocate Services cases involving applications for recognition of exempt status have been
increasing dramatically in recent years, demonstrating "that the IRS's processes are
creating significant hardship for both new organizations and those whose exempt status
was automatically revoked."' 0' These concerns were in addition to the more specific
concerns regarding the handling of certain applications relating to political activity.102
Finally, GAO issued a critical report at the end of 2014 highlighting how shrinking
resources have made the IRS's oversight of charitable organizations less extensive and
more complicated.1 03 GAO also noted the need for the IRS to develop compliance goals
and additional performance measures to assess the impact of its enforcement activities,
while at the same time acknowledging the technical difficulty of doing so.o
Proposals to address these concerns tend to fall into three categories: reorganizing
the IRS to enhance the prominence of the exempt organizations function, increasing and
improving procedures for gathering and analyzing information relating to exempt
organizations, and increasing the financial and personnel resources devoted to the exempt
organizations function. For the most part, the IRS and Congress have already implemented
9 Ginsburg et al., supra note 29, at 2583 (citations omitted).
100 PANEL FINAL REP., supra note 98, at 24.
101 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2014, ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 540 [hereinafter 1 NTA 2014
ANN. REP].
102 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL REP. TO CONGRESS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND
THE RIGHTS

(2013); see also supra note 1.
103 GAO 2014 EO REP., supra note 21, at 19-23.
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the first category of proposals. In 1969, the IRS doubled the number of revenue agents and
tax auditors assigned to exempt organization managers, provided them with special
training, and centralized the consideration of such matters in key districts.' 0 5 In 1974,
Congress created a new Office of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations headed by
an Assistant Commissioner within the IRS National Office, and the IRS in turn created a
separate Exempt Organizations Division within that office as well as Employee Plans and
Exempt Organizations offices within its regional and key district field offices.' 0 6 The next
25 or so years saw some slippage with respect to the prominence and particularly the
resources allocated to the exempt organizations function within the IRS.' 0 7 Nevertheless,
when Congress reorganized the IRS in the late 1990s to shift from a geographic to a
functional structure, it retained the prominence of the exempt organizations function within
the IRS by making the new Tax Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE) Division one
of the four primary operating divisions, albeit the smallest in terms of budget and
personnel. 08 Within that division there is a separate Exempt Organizations (EO) office,
headed by an EO Director who reports directly to the TE/GE Commissioner.1 09 Given the
relatively small size of the exempt organization sector numerically and financially
compared to individuals and businesses, any further increase in prominence within the IRS
is both unlikely and difficult to justify." 0
The second category of proposals is illustrated by the increased obligations
imposed on exempt organizations with respect to both the initial application and the annual
information return detailed above."' It is also illustrated by IRS efforts to concentrate
examinations on certain potential problem areas, such as colleges and universities, credit
counseling, hospitals, and political activity, as well as more recent proposals to improve
data collection and analysis.112
The third category of proposals, relating to increased resources, is perhaps the most
common although also the least fruitful."' As detailed previously, the number of
employees and the financial resources dedicated to the IRS's exempt organizations
function appears to have been relatively stagnant, even as the number, financial assets, and
federal tax law applicable to such organizations has grown significantly." 4 At the same
time, there appears to be little congressional interest in increasing IRS funding." 5

Ginsburg et al., supra note 29, at 2585.
Id. at 2520, 2622, 2627.
107 See Robert A. Boisture et al., How the IRS Plans to Restructure Its
Exempt Organization
Operations, 10 J. TAX. OF EXEMPT ORGS. 195, 197-98 (1999); Owens, supra note 58, at 3-4.
10 See Boisture, supra note 107, at 201-02.
105

106

1' See IRM 1.1.23.2(1), 1.1.23.5(2), http://www.irs.gov/irm/partl/irm_01-001-023.html [http://
perma.cc/WS55-LQAL]; IRS, TAX EXEMPT & GOVERNMENT ENTITIES DIVISION AT-A-GLANCE, http://www
.irs.gov/Government-Entities/Tax-Exempt-&-Government-Entities-Division-At-a-Glance [http://perma.cc
/9G7M-WEHA]; IRS, TODAY'S IRS ORGANIZATION, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Today's-IRS-Organization
[http://perma.cc/J7H7-MZRE].
1o

See, e.g., IRS DATABOOK, 2014, at 3; IRS, supra note 85, at 11.

n1 See supra notes 48-49, 60 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., GAO 2014 EO REP., supra note 21, at 26; supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supranote 8, at 471; PANEL FINAL REP.,
supra note 98, at 24.
114 See supra notes 10, 12, 50, 62 and accompanying
text.
115 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-624, IRS 2016 BUDGET:
IRS Is SCALING
BACK ACTIVITIES AND USING BUDGET FLEXIBILITIES TO ABSORB FUNDING CUTS 31 (2015); 1 NTA 2014 ANN.
REP., supra note 101, at 22-23; Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the InternalRevenue
Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX. REV. 725 (2015), at 758-65; Memorandum from J. Russell George to Jacob Lew,
supra note 4, at 1-2.
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Realistically, not much more can be done with respect to increasing the
prominence of the exempt organizations function within the IRS." 6 Nor is a significant
increase in resources for the exempt organizations function likely in the foreseeable future,
given both the financial state of the federal government and the political unpopularity of
the IRS." 7 So while securing additional resources for this function will be revisited in Part
IV as part of considering possibly moving this function out of the IRS, this Part will assume
this function remains within the resource-constrained IRS as currently structured and
focuses instead on the possibilities for improving the efficiency of IRS procedures.
There is a rich academic literature discussing how to increase compliance with the
tax laws, although it rarely reaches the relative backwater of exempt organizations."" This
literature discusses a variety of process-oriented methods that may be effective with respect
to such organizations." 9 This Part will first briefly explain why some methods that may
be effective with respect to taxpayers generally have little potential with respect to exempt
organizations before turning to those methods that have more promise. This Part also
focuses on methods that do not require changes in the substantive standards for exempt
status. The reason for this limitation is that recent attempts to enact such changes have
only resulted in limited legislative enactments addressing specific, identified concerns as
opposed to more comprehensive changes that could significantly impact compliance across
all or most exempt organizations. 120 Recent congressional tax reform proposals have also
generally not reached the substantive laws governing exemption. 121 In contrast, Congress
has recently been willing to enact significant procedural changes relating to reporting and

disclosure. i22
B.

Methods Unlikely to Significantly Improve Oversight

Some of the methods proposed to aid compliance with the federal tax laws are
generally a poor fit for exempt organizations. For example, increasing the regulation of or
penalties on gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants is unlikely to be particularly
helpful.1 23 This is both because many exempt organizations do not use such gatekeepers

116

117

See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.

See CONG.

BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2015 To 2025 1 (2015); supra

note 115 and accompanying text.
1" See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The InterplayBetween Norms andEnforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience andInfluence to Narrow the
Tax Gap, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 483 (2009); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to
Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009).
".. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX

GAP (2006); W. Edward Afield, Diningwith Tax Collectors:Reducing the Tax Gap Through ChurchGovernment Partnerships,7 RUTGERS Bus. L.J. 53, 57-58 (2010); Dave Rifkin, A Primeron the "Tax Gap"
and Methodologiesfor Reducing It, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 408-420 (2009).
120 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note
84, at 44-53.
121 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX

REFORM ACT OF 2014, DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS TO REFORM THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: TITLE V - TAX EXEMPT ENTITIES (JCX-16-14) 38-45

(2014); Press Release, Senate Finance Committee, Hatch, Wyden Launch Bipartisan Finance Committee Tax
Reform Working Groups (Jan. 15, 2015) (none of the five working groups focus on exempt organizations)
(on file with author).
122 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007, 124 Stat.
119, 855-59 (2010); Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1224-1225, 120 Stat. 780, 1091-93
(2006).
123 See generally W. Edward Afield, A Marketfor Tax Compliance, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315
(2014); Leslie Book, The Need to Increase PreparerResponsibility, Visibility and Competence, in 2 NAT'L
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and because there is evidence that the exempt organizations most likely to have the
resources to engage such gatekeepers, such as colleges, universities, and hospitals,
generally have a high level of compliance with the applicable federal tax laws. 124
Similarly, increasing the penalties for noncompliance imposed on the organizations or their
managers would only enhance compliance if the organizations and their leaders are aware
of those costs and believe there is a significant risk of discovery of non-compliance.1 25
None of these facts appear to exist with respect to most exempt organizations; most such
organizations lack expert advisors to inform them about potential penalties, usually
because of resource constraints,1 2 6 and the current examination rate, and thus the risk of
discovery is-and is known to be-very low.1 2 7

Rewarding whistleblowers and encouraging private enforcement actions through
enabling qui tam lawsuits are alternative methods for enhancing compliance with the
federal tax laws without requiring increased governmental resources, since they enlist
private parties to improve compliance. 128 The success of the existing federal tax
whistleblowing program has been relatively limited, however, and has not generated much
interest with respect to exempt organizations.1 29 Furthermore, rewards for whistleblowers
(and qui tam suit filers) are usually a portion of the tax revenue collected as a result, which
would not be particularly effective with respect to exempt organizations. Insiders at
charities and other exempt organizations may also be less inclined to engage in
whistleblowing than employees of for-profit companies because of the potential harm to
their organization's mission and those who benefit from its activities. Finally, the exempt
organizations area may be particularly vulnerable to damaging harassment if such methods
are available, given the controversial nature of some exempt organizations and their usually
limited financial resources to defend themselves against false accusations.
Two other methods that have improved compliance significantly, with respect to
federal tax laws, are generally also a poor fit for the exempt organizations area. The first
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 74 (2009); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy of Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
124 See Public CharityOrganizationalIssues, UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax, and The Revised
Form 990: HearingBefore the Sub comm. on Oversightof the H. Comm. on Ways andMeans, 112th Cong. 46
(2012) (statement of Eve Borenstein) [hereinafter Borenstein Statement]; supra notes 88-90 and

accompanying text. The one possible significant exception is private foundations. See Francie Ostrower,
The Role of Advisors to the Wealthy, in AMERICA'S WEALTHY AND THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 247, 26364 (Teresa Odendahl ed., 1987); supra note 93 and accompanying text.
125 See generally Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972); Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowingthe Tax Gap Through
Presumptive Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 120 (2011); J. Manhire, Toward a Perspective-Dependent
Theory ofAudit Probabilityfor Tax Compliance Models, 33 VA. TAX REV. 629 (2014); Alex Raskolnikov,
Crime andPunishmentin Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
569 (2006).
126 See Borenstein Statement, supra note 124, at 46; Gries et al.,
supra note 48, at 3-4.
127 See Karen A. Froelich & Terry W. Knoepfle, InternalRevenue Service
990 Data: Factor
Fiction?, 25 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 40, 49 (1996); supra note 55 and accompanying text.
128 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAx LAW. 357, 377-79 (2008);
Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1922-23
(2013). See generally Kneave Riggall, Should Tax Informants Be Paid? The Law and Economics of a
Government Monopsony, 28 VA. TAx REV. 237 (2008).
129 See IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7623) FISCAL YEAR
2014 REP. TO CONGRESS 13-14 (2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/WBAnnual Report FY_14

&

Final_SignatureJune_ 11 -signed%20corrected.pdf [http://perma.cc/4649-Z8P2]; Karie Davis-Nozemack

Sarah Webber, Paying the IRS Whistleblower:A CriticalAnalysis of Collected Proceeds, 32 VA. TAX REV.
77, 89 (2012).
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is the highly successful introduction of third-party information reporting (e.g., the wellknown Form W-2).130 In the exempt organizations area, there is no obvious third party to
provide information relating to compliance, nor is it clear what information could be
reported that would be particularly useful to the IRS.' 3' The other such method is the
withholding of taxes owed by the source of the taxable income.13 2 However, for exempt
organizations, there (usually) is no tax to withhold in the first place.
Beyond these specific process-oriented methods, a significant portion of recent
compliance literature discusses methods for shifting the attitudes of taxpayers from the
apparently dominant norm of noncompliance with the applicable tax laws, generally
through a "responsive regulation" approach.133 This approach includes cooperative
compliance efforts that seek to resolve potential IRS-taxpayer disputes in a more
cooperative and efficient manner. 3 4 Existing, albeit limited, evidence indicates that most
exempt organizations and particularly the largest grouping of them (charities) already have
a strong pro-compliance bias, however.135 There is therefore probably little room to
strengthen pro-compliance norms among such organizations generally, and probably not
much to be gained from cooperative compliance programs or similar techniques. 136
Finally, some of the other common methods proposed for improving compliance
with the federal tax laws would require the IRS to have significantly more resources, which
is not a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future for the reasons already discussed.13 7
For example, more resources would be required to significantly increase guidance and
other educational materials given the IRS-wide decline in guidance over the past several
decades. 138 The same obstacle would apply to simply increasing the number of
examinations (as opposed to changing examination methods to do more with less,
discussed below). Finally, significantly improving the technology used by the IRS would
also require substantial additional resources. Indeed, the Treasury Department has
identified all three of these areas as priorities for the IRS, but the IRS has made little
progress with respect to them precisely because of its shrinking budget.13 9
130

See Forman & Mann, supra note 115, at 22-23; Leandra Lederman, Statutory SpeedBumps: The

Roles ThirdPartiesPlay in Tax Compliance, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 695, 698 (2007).
131 See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the
Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAML. REv. 1733, 1739-41 (2010).
132 See Lederman, supra note 130, at 698. See generally Ajay Mehrotra, "From
Contested Concept
to Cornerstone ofAdministrative Practice":Social Learning and the Early Historyof U.S. Tax Withholding,
7 COLUM. J. TAXL. 144 (2016).
133 See generally Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction,
29 LAW
& POL'Y 3 (2007); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance:Recommendations for
the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599 (2007); Lederman, supra note 118; Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The
Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000).
134 See, e.g., W. Edward Afield, Agency Activism as a New Way ofLife: Administrative
Modification of the InternalRevenue Code Through Limited Issue FocusedExaminations, 7 FLA. TAX REV.
455, 461-72 (2006); Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administration,66 TAxL. REV.
121, 132-37 (2012); Diane M. Ring, On the FrontierofProceduralInnovation: Advance PricingAgreements
and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, 159-69 (2000).
135 See supra Part II.E.
136 But see Betsy Buchalter Adler et al., Proposalfor an Exempt OrganizationsVoluntary
Compliance Program,in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND Gov'T ENTITIES, REPORT OF
RECOMMENDATIONS 61 (2007).
137
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Methods with the Potential to Significantly Improve Oversight

C.

Several methods show more promise, however. The IRS has already implemented
one set of such methods by introducing procedures and a new form to streamline the
application process for organizations seeking recognition of exempt status as described
below. Another set of such methods is greater reliance on resource-intensive examination
techniques, such as correspondence audits, no-contact review of operations procedures,
and the use of compliance data to better target examinations. A third set of such methods
is designed to improve disclosure and transparency to enhance media and public input with
respect to exempt organizations, including during both the application and examination
processes. A final promising method would be requiring increased electronic filing.
1.

StreamlinedApplication Procedures

The IRS recently made two significant decisions to streamline the application for
recognition of exemption process. The first of these decisions was the introduction of an
expedited review process for applications submitted by organizations seeking exemption
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), primarily to clear the backlog of such applications in the wake of
the controversy over the handling of them. The second was the introduction of the new
Form 1023-EZ, a streamlined application form for certain organizations seeking exemption
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), along with streamlined procedures for all applications.
a.

Expedited Process for Certain I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
Applications

Less than two months after the I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) application controversy exploded
in May 2013, newly appointed acting IRS Commissioner Daniel Werfel issued an Initial
Assessment and Plan of Action to address the crisis.1 40 A major component of the plan
was the creation of a voluntary process for expediting I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) applications that
had been pending for more than 120 days as of May 28, 2013 and in which the
organizations had indicated that they may be involved in political campaign intervention
or issue advocacy.' 4 For eligible applicants that chose to take advantage of this process,
the IRS promised to grant their pending application within two weeks if an authorized
official of the organization declared, under penalties of perjury, that the organization (1)
had spent in each past year and would spend in the current year and each future year 60
percent or more in terms of both expenditures and time (employee and volunteer) on
activities promoting social welfare and (2) for each such year had spent or would spend
less than 40 percent on participation or intervention in any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.1 42 The IRS later expanded this
program to give itself the option of inviting later filing organizations to make these
declarations, and receive a favorable determination in return, if the IRS determined that the

note 119, at 2-3 (three of seven reducing tax gap components are improvements in information technology,
improving compliance activities, and enhancing taxpayer service); Memorandum from J. Russell George to
Jacob Lew, supra note 4, at 6, 13-14.
140

DANIEL WERFEL, CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT THE IRS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PLAN OF

ACTION (June 24, 2013) http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/Initial%/`20Assessment%/`20and%/`20Plan%/`20of
%20Action.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZJJ5-WBPL].
141 Id., App. E.
142 id.
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only potential issues raised by the organization's application were possible involvement in
political campaign intervention or providing private benefit to a political party. 4 3
The program has achieved its short-term goal of clearing the backlog of
applications raising political campaign intervention issues. The IRS reported that as of
August 2015 141 (97 percent) of the 145 organizations that were eligible for the expedited
process had had their cases resolved, including 43 organizations that chose the optional
expedited process, with the IRS issuing 108 favorable determination letters. 4 4 Separately,
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported that of the 160
applications for recognition of exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) that involved possible
political activity and were open as of December 17, 2012, 149 applications had been closed
as of March 2015 and the 11 remaining applications were either in litigation, in Appeals,
or had received a proposed adverse determination. 145
b.

New Form 1023-EZ & Streamlined Procedures

In mid-2014, the IRS announced a new "Streamlined Application for Recognition
of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3)"-the Form 1023-EZ. 146 Only organizations
anticipating relatively low annual gross receipts ($50,000 or less), owning total assets not
exceeding $250,000, lacking a variety of other characteristics (such as being a church,
school, or hospital), and not planning to engage in certain activities (such as credit
counseling or maintaining donor advised funds) are eligible to use this new form.1 47 For
the organizations that are eligible to use the new form, however, relatively minimal
information is required and, most importantly, certain key requirements are deemed
satisfied as long as an appropriate official of the organization attests that they have been
met. These requirements include whether the group's organizing document contains
required provisions (thereby avoiding the need to provide the IRS with an actual copy of
that document), whether the group is organized and will be operated exclusively for
permitted purposes (thereby avoiding the need to provide a narrative description of the
group's current and planned activities), and whether the group has not and will not conduct
prohibited activities such as supporting candidates or providing a substantial private
benefit. 14" The application also asks whether the organization will engage in certain
permitted but limited or regulated activities, such as attempting to influence legislation,
paying compensation to officers, directors, or trustees, and operating overseas.149
The Form 1023-EZ grew out of streamlined procedures for processing applications
for recognition of exemption under any I.R.C. § 501(c) paragraph. The IRS first adopted
these procedures for applications that had been pending for more than a year, but then
extended these procedures to all pending applications, and finally to new applications as

143
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145 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., STATUS OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE
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well.5 o Similar to the Form 1023-EZ, these procedures generally require attestations, as
opposed to copies of organizing documents or narrative descriptions to resolve open issues
if certain conditions are satisfied.' 5
As with the optional expedited process for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) applications, these
changes appear to have achieved their short-term goal of clearing the backlog of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) applications. GAO recently found that the IRS had reduced the inventory of
all applications (the vast majority of which were presumably for recognition of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) status) from 65,718 at the end of fiscal year 2013 to 22,759 at the end of fiscal
year 2014, and had closed 117,000 cases in fiscal year 2014 (or more than double the
number of cases closed in the previous fiscal year).1 5 2 The IRS also separately reported
that the streamlined procedures adopted for all applications had reduced the inventory of
cases that were more than 270 days old from 54,564 in April 2014 to 4,791 in September
2014.15 The IRS further noted that by December 26, 2014 it had received 20,103 Forms
1023-EZ, representing approximately half of the applications under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) filed
during the period the Form 1023-EZ had been available, and that, on average, the IRS
processed Forms 1023-EZ in less than 30 days. 5 4
c.

Criticisms and Evaluation

The limited streamlined application process for certain I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
applicants, as well as the Form 1023-EZ and the broader streamlined process for all I.R.C.
§ 501(c) applicants, have attracted their share of criticisms. For the former, some
commentators viewed it as "giveaway" by the IRS and questioned whether the IRS would
have any appetite to later examine the returns of organizations that had taken advantage of
this expedited process. 15 Others criticized the IRS for not further clarifying the legal
standards regarding what qualifies as political campaign intervention and for requiring at
least 60 percent social welfare activity in order to take advantage of the process even
though there was no clear legal authority imposing such a requirement. 5 6
As for the new Form 1023-EZ, even before its introduction the IRS Advisory
Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities (ACT) recommended against
developing it because of the important educational purpose that the Form 1023 served by
forcing applying organizations both to consider deeply their activities, finances, and
management and to recognize that they would be subject to a comprehensive regulatory
regime. '57 ACT was also concerned that such an abbreviated form would not supply
150
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information needed by the IRS both to make an accurate determination regarding whether
the applying organization qualified for exempt status and to spot potential abuse risks. 5
The National Association of State Charity Officials (NASCO) reiterated these concerns in
April 2014, highlighting in particular the increased opportunity for fraud and the resulting
heightened burden on federal and state regulators in the long-term. 159 The National
Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) also criticized the IRS for introducing the Form 1023-EZ in its
current form, and particularly for that form's use of attestations in place of copies of
organizing documents and a narrative statement of current and planned activities.16 0 While
NTA had previously proposed the development of a Form 1023-EZ for use by certain small
organizations, the Form 1023-EZ actually introduced by the IRS was developed without
consulting the Taxpayer Advocate Service and went much further in reducing the
information required than NTA had anticipated.' 6 Finally, a number of practitioners and
other commentators also raised concerns about the Form 1023-EZ not providing sufficient
information to the IRS, the applicant, or the public (if the IRS approves the application,
which causes it to become public).1 6 2 While the focus of most critics has been on the Form
1023-EZ, some of the same criticisms would also apply to the more general streamlined
application procedures to the extent they rely on attestations.
At this point there is no information on whether any of the groups that are seeking
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) exempt status and that took advantage of the new expedited process have
acted contrary to their declarations, nor has the IRS announced any specific plans for
follow-up examinations of such organizations. There is some preliminary information
regarding whether groups benefitting from the broader changes are in fact living up to their
attestations, however. According to NTA, when the IRS reviewed a representative sample
of Forms 1023-EZ the approval rate for such applications was less than 80 percent, or well
below the overall approval rate for such applications of 95 percent through December 26,
2014.163 This approval rate is actually less than the overall approval rate prior to the
introduction of the Form 1023-EZ and the streamlined procedures, which from 2010
through 2013 ranged from 81.6 percent to 89.8 percent for applications filed under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3). i64
This relatively low approval rate may indicate that the smaller
organizations may actually be less likely to make it through the approval process, for
whatever reasons (including not responding to IRS inquiries), than larger ones. 16' NTA
also reported that a non-representative check of organizational documents for a handful of
Form 1023-EZ filers found that most had documents that did not meet the organizational
15s

Id.

Letter from Alissa Hecht Gardenswartz, President, NASCO, to Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nasconet.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FINAL-NASCOcomments-re-Form-1023-EZ1.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6WR-PBZP].
160 1 NTA 2015 OBJECTIVES REPORT, supra note 150,
at 55.
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See 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE FISCAL YEAR, 2016 OBJECTIVES REP. TO CONGRESS 70
[hereinafter 1 NTA 2016 OBJECTIVES REPORT]; I NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS
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448 n.44, 562-64 [hereinafter 1 NTA 2011 ANN. REP.].
162 See Patricia Cohen, IRS Shortcut to Tax-Exempt Status Is Under Fire, N.Y.
TIES, Apr. 8, 2015;
Fred Stokeld, StreamlinedExemption Application CouldPose Compliance Problems, 143 TAX NOTES 439
(2014); David van den Berg, New IRS Form May Fuel Nonprofit PoliticalActivity, 144 TAX NOTES 671
(2014); George K. Yin, The IRS's Misuse ofScarce EO Compliance Resources, 146 TAX NOTES 267 (2015).
But see Manoj Viswanathan, Form 1023-EZ and the StreamlinedProcessfor the FederalIncome Tax
Exemption: Is the IRS Slashing Red Tape or Opening Pandora'sBox?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 89 (2014).
163 1 NTA 2016 OBJECTIVES REPORT, supra note 161, at 72-73.
164 See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
165 See 1 NTA 2016 OBJECTIVES REPORT, supra
note 161, at 75.
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test under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) even though the applicants had attested they satisfied that
test. 166 The IRS plans to select another sample of Form 1023-EZ filers for a postdetermination compliance program involving correspondence examinations in early fiscal
year 2016.
While preliminary (and with respect to the organizational documents, anecdotal),
these data are troubling. Two other, related sets of data also raise concerns about the
accuracy of self-reported information. As noted previously, there are data indicating that
exempt organizations' annual returns often contain inaccurate information, even if usually
unintentionally. 6 There are also data indicating that a significant number of donors to
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations who claim deductions for noncash contributions fail to
properly substantiate those contributions and so may be claiming undeserved tax
benefits.1 69 While such donors of course have a strong financial incentive to exaggerate
the value of their contributions, exempt organizations also have incentives both to mask
any possible noncompliance and to provide favorable but inaccurate financial
information. 170
The IRS is facing a crisis in the form of a growing backlog of applications, driven
in large part by reinstatement requests arising out of the congressionally mandated
automatic revocation process, and lacks additional resources to devote to processing those
applications. Furthermore, if the vast majority of applicants are seeking exempt status in
good faith and desire to comply with the applicable laws, as is likely the case, then it is
overly burdensome to require all applicants to go through an overly lengthy process to
identify a relatively small number of bad actors (contrary to the concerns raised by ACT
and NASCO). This is particularly true given that the application is ill-suited to ferreting
out bad actors because much of the information provided is aspirational (what the
organization plans to do, as opposed to what it has done or is doing) and the IRS is generally
limited to considering the information provided by the organization itself, making
deception relatively easy.
That said, even organizations that desire to comply with the applicable laws need
their leaders to have both an understanding of those laws and incentives to make
compliance a sufficiently high priority amongst the many competing demands for time and
resources for new organizations. Early indications are that new Form 1023-EZ has a
significant failure rate in this regard, which does not bode well for the adoption of
streamlined procedures that also rely on attestations. This information suggests several
areas where further evaluation is needed and, if that further evaluation confirms these
concerns, the IRS should make improvements to both the Form 1023-EZ and the
streamlined procedures.
With respect to further evaluation, the IRS needs to complete its planned postdetermination evaluation of a statistically valid sample of Form 1023-EZ filers to
determine whether in fact their attestations were accurate, including with respect to
required organizational document provisions. As important, the IRS, or an oversight group
166
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168

See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.

169 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., MANY TAXPAYERS ARE
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such as the Government Accountability Office, NTA, or TIGTA needs also to do a similar
evaluation of Form 1023 filers that used attestations to resolve outstanding issues with
respect to their applications (which the IRS does not appear to currently be planning).
While the IRS should also do an evaluation, with respect to politically active organizations
seeking I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) status that successfully used the optional streamlined procedure,
it is almost certainly not worth the effort from a tax compliance perspective, given the
political sensitivity of asking such groups for additional information, the relatively small
number of them, and the relatively small amount of tax at issue with respect to them
(especially since they only receive exemption, not the ability to receive tax deductible
contributions).
If such evaluations reveal a significant level of noncompliance, as early indications
imply they will, then both the Form 1023-EZ and the streamlined procedures need to be
modified to sufficiently educate organizational leaders about the applicable laws and to
reduce opportunities for noncompliance. Possible methods for improving education
include requiring applicants to review critical definitions and requirements before
providing related attestations on the electronically filed form (as opposed to simply urging
them to review the lengthy instructions for that form), providing FAQs for the form (which
have not been released even though the form has now been available for over a year), and
requiring applicants to complete the eligibility form electronically (with critical definitions
and requirements readily available or required to be reviewed) as opposed to simply
attesting that they have done so.1 72 While in theory it would be helpful if more applicants
consulted experienced advisors during the application process, small organizations eligible
to complete the Form 1023-EZ are unlikely to have been able to obtain such assistance
even if they were still required to complete the Form 1023.173 Absent resources to aid such
organizations in obtaining professional help, which the IRS is certainly not in a position to
provide, it is necessary to better educate the organizational leaders who are almost certainly
going to be primarily, if not exclusively, responsible for completing the forms.
Possible methods for reducing noncompliance opportunities include requiring
additional information to verify compliance (such as copies of organizational documents,
if noncompliance in that area is found to be a significant issue) and selecting a substantial
number of applications for close review within a certain time period after a favorable
determination.1 74 For reasons already discussed, increasing the penalties on individuals
who complete the form is less likely to be helpful. 175 The exact educational and
compliance-enhancing methods chosen will ultimately depend, however, on the areas of
significant noncompliance identified by the further evaluations.
2.

More Efficient Examination Techniques

Because low examination rates are an issue for all types of taxpayers,
commentators have suggested various techniques for more efficiently conducting
examinations. Such suggestions are particularly important for the exempt-organizations
function, given the new streamlined application processes that reduce the level of initial
oversight. These techniques include a greater reliance on correspondence audits, better

172
173
174
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targeting of examinations, and the expanded use of operations reviews that do not require
direct contact with the organization at issue.
Correspondence audits are conducted by mail and are in theory less burdensome
for the IRS (and taxpayers) because they eliminate in-person meetings with, and on-site
visits by, IRS employees.' 7 6 They also often are more focused than in-person examinations
because they are limited to specific issues identified by IRS review of the taxpayer's
relevant return(s).' 7 7 The savings can be significant-the GAO recently estimated that the
cost per case for an individual income tax correspondence audit is $274, compared to
$2,278 for a field examination-in terms of IRS resources. 7" Correspondence audits could
potentially provide these benefits in the exempt organizations area as well. In fact,
approximately a quarter of the examinations that the Exempt Organizations Division
completed in fiscal year 2012 were correspondence audits. 179 This proportion is
significantly less than the three-quarters for individual audit.8 0
Better targeting of examinations is usually accomplished by first examining a
statistically valid sample of similar organizations to determine both overall levels of
compliance and likely indicators or areas of significant noncompliance.
Given the
diversity of the exempt organizations area in terms of purposes, types of activities, financial
size, and complexity, and therefore the likely variance with respect to levels and types of
noncompliance, such targeting has the potential to increase the efficiency of IRS oversight
of such organizations. The IRS has in fact attempted to use these techniques in this area
through the compliance projects cited previously, as well as other "market segment"
efforts.18 2 The current Exempt Organizations Director recently announced plans to move
instead to an issue-based approach.183 The GAO has also reported that the IRS is
considering additional areas for special focus with respect to Form 1023-EZ filers,
including "legislative or overseas activities, compensation issues, and unrelated business
activity." 84
The Review of Operations (ROO) program involves IRS review of an exempt
organization's annual returns and of publicly available information, with limited or no
contact with the organization at issue unless the organization is referred for an
176 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO-14-479, IRS CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS: BETTER
MANAGEMENT COULD IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REDUCE TAXPAYER BURDEN 1-2 (2014) [hereinafter
GAO 2014 AUDIT REP.]. They include "limited scope" or "soft contact" examinations and compliance checks
that may focus only a single issue. See Karl Emerson et al., The "RIPPLE"Project: Reviewing IRS Policies
and Proceduresto Leverage Enforcement: Recommendations to Enhance Exempt Organization's (EO)
Enforcement and ComplianceEfforts, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND Gov'T ENTITIES,
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS V-1, V-14 (2004); GAO 2015 REP., supra note 64, at 13-14.
177 See GAO 2014 AUDIT REP., supra note
176, at 7.
178 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFF., GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS COULD
SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASE REVENUES BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES 6 (2012).
179 EO 2012 ANN. REP., supra note 70,
at 5.
180

See GAO 2014 AUDIT REP., supra note 176, at 42.
&
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FIN. (forthcoming 2015); Leigh Osofsky, ConcentratedEnforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325 (2014).
182 See GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note 27, at 23-24; BRUCE R. HOPKINS, IRS AUDITS
OF TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES 137-39 (2008); supra notes 88-91 and
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examination. 8 5 The IRS initiated this program in response to requests for a process to
review all organizations several years after they successfully complete the application
process, but as established, it also affects older organizations. 186 Commentators have
recently renewed calls for such a review in light of the streamlined application processes
discussed above.

87

The primary advantage of correspondence audits and the ROO program is that by
limiting or even eliminating IRS interactions with exempt organizations, the employee time
and other resources devoted to each case are significantly reduced. Recent studies of
correspondence audits, conducted outside the exempt organizations area, indicate that this
limitation results in at least two significant disadvantages, however. First, communication
with the targeted taxpayer is impaired, including through mail delivery failures, 8 8 low
taxpayer responsiveness,1 89 and a lack of taxpayer understanding regarding the process and
any identified issues. 190 This leads to significant taxpayer dissatisfactionl91 and even,
possibly, to violations of taxpayers' rights.1 9 2 Second, such audits, at least in the individual
income context, tend to be more superficial and less accurate than the field examinations
that they displace.1 93 The latter concern also likely applies to the ROO program, given that
it relies on IRS filings and publicly available information to identify possible
noncompliance as opposed to documents and information requested from the exempt
organization, as is the case for examinations.
Greater selectivity with respect to examination targets would in theory permit the
IRS to better detect significant pockets of noncompliance (particularly intentional
noncompliance), and focus its limited examination resources on those areas. In practice,
however, successfully implementing such selectivity is difficult. For example, NTA
recently found that the IRS tends not to use the already available information to inform its
examination process.1 9 4 In the exempt organizations area, the compliance projects noted
earlier either have not been designed to incorporate a statistically valid sample of
organizations of a particular type or engaged in a particular activity, or have ultimately
failed to do so at the examination stage (rendering the examination results not
representative and so of limited utility).1 95
The IRS, therefore, needs to evaluate its existing exempt organization
correspondence audit, ROO, and its selective examination programs to determine if the
See TIGTA 2008 REP., supra note 94.
See id. at 1-2, 4.
187 E.g., Bedingfield, supra note 174; see also Evelyn Brody, Time for an
EO-EZ Statusfor Small
Charities, 147 TAX NOTES 815 (2015) (recommending provisional approval for Form 1023-EZ filers).
See 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 82 [hereinafter 2 NTA 2011
185
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191 See Ann Marie Maloney, CorrespondenceAudits Need Some Work, Tax Community Tells IRS, J.
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criticisms have merit and, if so, can be resolved favorably. If the same problems apply in
the context of exempt organizations targeted for correspondence examinations, it appears
most of the highlighted problems could be resolved by providing more accurate
information to the targeted organizations regarding the examination process and timeframe
and, most importantly, by providing the organizations with the ability to interact, at least
by telephone, with the examining agent.1 9 6 While the latter change would be more costly,
it appears that the IRS has given resource conservation too high a priority, resulting in
unfair treatment of examination targets and in high levels of taxpayer dissatisfaction.
With respect to accuracy and depth issues, if they exist in the exempt organization
correspondence audit and ROO programs, they may represent an unavoidable trade-off for
the resource savings those programs represent. That trade-off puts even greater importance
on gathering and applying data that can be used to selectively target examinations better,
both to focus the issues addressed in those programs and to determine what issues or
organizations require relatively resource-intensive field examinations as opposed to these
less costly, but less thorough, reviews. Here, the IRS needs to do a better job, even at an
increased initial investment cost, at conducting statistically valid sampling of major exempt
organization categories and activities, so that its limited resources can be better targeted in
the future.
3.
IncreasedDisclosure
Commentators have cited increased disclosure of information to the public as
having the potential to enhance compliance with the federal tax laws both generally and
specifically with respect to exempt organizations. 197 This specific application is in large
part because the normal presumption of confidentiality of taxpayer information does not
generally apply for exempt organizations.1 98 Both the IRS and exempt organizations are
required to make publicly available applications for recognition of exemption (after the
application is granted) and annual information returns, with only relatively limited
redactions permitted (e.g., donor information, trade secrets, etc.).1 99 Such disclosure has
been enhanced both through the increasing amount of information required on these
forms200 and through the efforts of private parties, particularly GuideStar, which makes all
recent annual returns of exempt organizations available on the Internet.20
Even given this high level of existing disclosure, commentators have identified
several areas where greater disclosure could enhance compliance with little additional
burden on the IRS. One such area is that of pending applications, which are currently not
subject to disclosure until the application is approved. 202 Another area is that of
examinations, which are not subject to disclosure except that if the examination results in
revocation of exempt status, that result is made public when it is finalized or litigated; but
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199 See I.R.C. § 6104 (2014); JCT DISCLOSURE REP., supra note 198, at 34-38.
200 See supra notes 48-49, 60-61 and accompanying
text.
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even still, such a result is not widely disseminated.203 Other suggestions include enhancing
information-sharing with state regulators, even if that information is not made available to
the public.20 4
Common advantages cited for increased disclosure with respect to taxpayers
generally include shaming them into compliance; 205 improving public perceptions of the
level of compliance; the risk of noncompliance; 206 and, particularly for exempt
organizations, vindicating the public's right to know about entities that enjoy significant
tax benefits.207 Increased disclosure also has the potential to provide enhanced oversight
at little cost to the IRS by essentially enlisting the media and public in reviewing the
disclosed information. 208 Even commentators who are supportive of increased disclosure
acknowledge various risks, however. These risks include potential privacy harms, the risk
of harassment for more controversial exempt organizations and their leaders, the risk of
disclosing IRS examination selection criteria, the burden on the IRS of managing and
enforcing disclosure rules, the burden on the exempt organizations themselves, and the risk
of imposing extra-legal requirements. 20 9
Furthermore, disclosure by itself does not necessarily lead to increased oversightthe media and public may choose not to use the revealed information or even to take the
time to review it, and state regulators may have other enforcement priorities. 2 1 0 At the
same time, the IRS would have to manage any such disclosure system and deal with
requests for exceptions based on claims of potential harassment or other legitimate
grounds. So while disclosure may improve the public accountability of the IRS, its actual
effect on compliance is less certain and may not be worth even its modest burden on the
IRS and exempt organizations. 2 11 At a minimum, the IRS should take steps to evaluate
whether, and to what extent, disclosure could enhance the detection of noncompliance.
4.
IncreasedElectronicFiling
A related and widely shared recommendation is to increase the extent of required
electronic filing by exempt organizations ("e-filing"). Indeed, strong support for expanded,
mandatory e-filing for exempt organizations is found not only throughout the federal
government but also in the exempt sector itself.2 12 Currently, e-filing is required only for
See, e.g., JCT DISCLOSURE REP., supra note 198, at 84-86; Helge, supra
note 97, at 75; Yin,
supra note 197, at 1158-62.
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note 42, at 34-38.
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TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008, at All.
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note 197, at 1149-50.
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the annual information returns filed by the largest organizations and for the Form 1023-EZ
and Form 990-N, which only certain, relatively small exempt organizations may use.2 13
Increased e-filing would enhance both public and IRS access to filed
information. 2 14 Increased e-filing may also have at least two other significant benefits.
First, e-filing may prevent some common errors on both applications and annual returns,
as well as help educate applicants about the applicable legal requirements, thereby aiding
organizations that desire to file accurate forms but through inadvertent errors fail to do
so. 2 15 Second, expanded mandatory e-filing could enhance the ability of the IRS to target
examination efforts as discussed above. Currently, the IRS is limited in its use of
information from electronically filed returns because it can only incorporate in computer
analyses information that it also enters from non-electronically filed returns (in order to not
disadvantage organizations that electronically file).216 If Congress required all exempt
organizations to file their annual returns electronically, the IRS could instead analyze all
of the submitted information. A survey by the ACT found that few exempt organizations
believe e-filing would be burdensome, so the only significant downside to increased
mandatory e-filing would be the need for an initial investment by the IRS.217 As with the
other methods discussed above, however, the IRS would still need to evaluate the results
of electronic filing to determine if in fact it leads to the expected compliance benefits.
The above discussion demonstrates that there are a number of ways to improve
compliance by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax laws through more
efficient oversight by the IRS. In addition, enacting these various methods in tandem could
create helpful synergies. For example, e-filing could both make disclosure easier and
enhance the ability of the IRS to target examinations. None of these methods is without its
disadvantages; however, there may be ways to offset or even eliminate them, such as by
prioritizing organizations that take advantage of the streamlined application process for
examination several years after IRS recognition of exemption.
At the same time, there is no obvious solution. Even if Congress, the Treasury,
and the IRS were willing and able to enact, evaluate, and recalibrate all of these methods,
as is necessary, it is far from clear that they would be able to significantly enhance
compliance by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax laws, given the current
resource limitations faced by the IRS and the unlikelihood of significant changes to the
substantive legal standards for exemption. In a climate of pervasive concern regarding
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Improving its Effectiveness as a Reporting Tool andSource of Datafor the Exempt OrganizationCommunity,
in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOV'T ENTITIES, 2015 REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 85,
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possible bias in the IRS oversight of exempt organizations, more radical change is ripe for
consideration-moving the oversight function out of the IRS completely.
IV.
RETHINKING THE LOCUS OF OVERSIGHT
It is an unavoidable reality that the IRS is hobbled both by the awkwardness of
adapting its revenue-collection culture and practices to the regulation of exempt
organizations and by congressional hostility toward increasing the agency's funding. 218 As
these cultural and resource concerns are far from new, commentators have proposed
numerous alternatives to the IRS for housing the oversight role.219 Since at least the 1970s,
none of these proposals has attracted much attention, acceptance or implementation. The
extremity of current circumstances both justifies and renders more realistic the pursuit of
an alternative to the IRS, however.
This Part briefly summarizes the proposals for an alternate, national overseer for
exempt organizations. A national body, as opposed to state or local bodies, is key because
the oversight role flows from federal tax law. This Part then considers the advantages and
disadvantages that would likely arise from moving the exempt organization function out of
the IRS into either a new federal agency or a new private, self-regulatory body (albeit one
closely overseen by the federal government).
A.
Proposals for National Alternatives to the IRS
Commentators have developed essentially three national alternatives to the IRS.220
One proposal is the creation of a new federal regulatory agency. A second is the creation
of a federal advisory group. The third is the creation of a national self-regulatory
organization.
1.
New FederalRegulatory Agency
Even as Congress reorganized the IRS in the 1970s to increase the prominence and
resources available for the exempt organizations function, several commentators testified
before Congress in support of a bolder move with respect to charitable (I.R.C. § 501(c)(3))
organizations: creating a new national entity. 2 2 1 As later elaborated by others, the proposed
agency would be structured along the same lines as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), with commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate for set terms.222 The agency would take over the application, examination, and
guidance functions conducted by the IRS (except in instances where such organizations
owed unrelated business income tax); would compile and publish data relating to
philanthropic organizations and activities; and would advise both Congress and the
executive branch on charitable matters.2 23 Others writing at the same time were not
supportive of this proposal, however, preferring to put their faith in the then ongoing
changes at the IRS.224 Joel Fleishman revisited this proposal in 1999 but only as a strategy
See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 8, 461-66; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan
M. Wilson,
Regulating Charitiesin the Twenty-First Century: An InstitutionalChoice Analysis, 85 CHI. -KENT L. REV.
479, 495-504 (2010).
220 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note
8, at 461-63.
221 See Donald R. Spuehler, The System for Regulation andAssistance of Charity
in Englandand
Wales, with Recommendations on the Establishmentof a National Commission on Philanthropyin the United
218

219

States, in 5 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHLANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 3045 (1977).
222 Id. at 3080.
223 Id. at 3080-81.
224 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 29,
at 2642-44.
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of last resort if other, self-regulatory strategies had failed; he has since shifted his support
to a national self-regulatory organization. 22 5
2.
New FederalAdvisory Group
In the 1970s, two different commissions proposed a new federal advisory group.226
Such a group would serve an information gathering and sharing role, and would craft
recommended best practices and proposals for legislative and regulatory changes, but
would not exercise any regulatory authority itself, leaving that role to the IRS and the
states.227 These proposals also failed to gather sufficient support to advance, either then or
since. 22 Several private, national organizations have since arisen that serve in essentially
this role, however, albeit without a government imprimatur. The most prominent is
Independent Sector, which organized the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector.229 Other such
organizations include the Council on Foundations, the Evangelical Council for Financial
Accountability (which organized the Commission on Accountability and Policy for
Religious Organizations), and the National Council of Nonprofits.2 30
3.
New National Self-Regulatory Organization
In 1999 Fleishman also put forward the idea of a private self-regulatory
organization ("SRO") that would investigate and report malfeasance by unscrupulous
individuals or groups and propose best practices that go beyond legal requirements for
well-meaning but perhaps unwise or careless groups and their leaders, either as an
alternative or in addition to a joint private/public effort. 231 Former IRS Exempt
Organizations Division Director Marcus Owens modified and further developed this idea,
suggesting the creation of a quasi-public SRO that would work with the IRS in a similar
manner to how the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) currently works with
the SEC.232 His proposal would create an entity for which membership for organizations
seeking to attain or maintain I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status (or possibly any category of I.R.C.
§ 501(c) tax-exempt status) would be mandatory and over which representatives of the
regulated community would have influence but not control through a board divided equally

&

225 See JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET
257-58 (2007); Joel L.
Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizationsand the Needfor RegulatoryReform, in
PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 172, 187-91 (Charles T. Clotfelter
Thomas Ehrlich eds. 1999); see also Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation'sGovernance
and Self-Interested FiduciariesCallsfor FurtherRegulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1192 & n.494 (2001)

(endorsing Fleishman's 1999 proposal).
226 See ELEANOR L. BRILLIANT, PRIVATE CHARITY AND PUBLIC INQUIRY: A HISTORY OF THE FILER
AND PETERSON COMMISSIONS 94, 130-31 (2000); COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY, FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE GIVING, AND PUBLIC POLICY 181-88 (1970) [hereinafter PETERSON

COMM'N REP.]; Adam Yarmolinsky & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Preservingthe Private Voluntary Sector: A
Proposalfor a Public Advisory Commission on Philanthropy, in 5 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHLANTHROPY
AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2857, 2857-58 (1977).
227 PETERSON COMM'N REP., supra note 226, at 181-88; Yarmolinsky & Fremont-Smith, supranote
226, at 2858.
228 See BRILLIANT, supra note 226, at 95, 142-43.
229 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 8, at 462; PANEL FINAL REP., supra
note 98, at 110-112.
230 See Grumbach, supra note 209, at 15-16; COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, http://www.cof.org
[http://

perma.cc/WP6D-ECEV]; Press Release, ECFA to Lead Independent Commission on Major Accountability
and Policy Issues for Churches and Other Religious Organizations (Jan. 7, 2011); NATIONAL COUNCI OF
NONPROFITS, https://www.councilofnonprofits.org [http://perma.cc/B3Z8-2JZH].
231 Fleishman, supra note 225, at 186-87; see also STAFF OF THE SENATE FINANCE COMM.,
DISCUSSION DRAFT 14-15 (2004), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062204stfdis.pdf [http://

perma.cc/QX3C-8RN6] (proposing an IRS-supported, privately administered accreditation system).
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between sector representatives, governmental representatives, and independent "public
directors." 233 The SRO's focus would be on enforcing and interpreting the federal tax laws,
but subject to the ability of the IRS to reject or amend proposed rules.234 As noted above,
Fleishman has now endorsed Owens's proposal.23 5
B.
Considering the Proposals
Before considering the various proposals, it is necessary to determine what
characteristics would be optimal for an oversight body charged with ensuring compliance
by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax rules. As noted previously, the
body should be national in scope. Other desirable characteristics can be easily gleaned
from both the critics of the IRS in this regard and the proponents of the various alternatives:
an exclusive focus on overseeing exempt organizations; a realistic possibility of increased
funding; a staff capable of impartial, accurate, and professional application of the pertinent
federal tax laws; and systems and procedures that reflect a regulatory as opposed to a
revenue-collecting focus.

23

6

The second option-a federal advisory body-is clearly inferior to the other
possibilities for at least two reasons. First, it would be duplicative of various private,
advisory bodies that have arisen or grown in prominence since the 1970s.2 37 Second,
because it is advisory in nature, its positions would not be binding on the regulated
community and so it would be significantly limited in its ability to promote compliance.2 38
The remaining possibilities raise two sets of advantages and disadvantages. One
set relates to moving the oversight function out of the IRS, even if it were to remain within
the federal government. The second set relates to moving that function out of the federal
government to a private SRO, albeit one still tied to the federal government in various
ways.
1.
Leaving the IRS
The spin off of a regulatory function from an existing agency into a separate federal
agency is unusual but not unprecedented. For example, Congress spun the Federal
Communications Commission off from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
because the task of regulating telephone service had simply grown too great to leave as a
secondary function of the ICC. 23 9 In a similar way, it appears the exempt organization
function has grown from a relatively small role for the IRS to a much larger one both
because of the growth in the number and complexity of such organizations and because of
increased oversight expectations on the part of Congress and the public.240
Moving some or most of exempt organization oversight to a new federal agency
would increase accountability for that oversight, since it would be the sole function of the
new agency as opposed to only one function among many at the IRS.24 1 Such a move
233 Id.
234

at 18-19.
Id. at 20.

235 FLEISHMAN,

supra note 225, at 257-58; see also Helge, supra note 97, at 70 (also endorsing this

approach, but with significant modifications).
236 See Helge, supra note 97, at 20-33; Owens, supra note 58, at 4-7; supra
notes 1, 99-104 and
accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 229-230 and accompanying
text.
238 See Owens, supra note 58,
at 7-8.
239 See Kristin E. Hickman, Pursuinga Single Mission (or Something Closer
to It) for the IRS, 7
COLUM. J. TAxL. 169 (2016).
240
241

See supra Part II. A.
See FLEISHMAN, supra note 225, at 256.

116

[
[Vol.7:80

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

would also permit the development of procedures and rules designed for the regulatory
nature of this oversight, as opposed to the revenue-collection procedures and rules of the
IRS, which include a presumption of taxpayer confidentiality and procedures that delay
examinations until after the filing of an annual return.242 Furthermore, it would allow a
reboot of the regulator's relationship with the exempt organizations community, providing
an opportunity to put the recent I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) application controversy firmly in the
rearview mirror (and free the IRS from the risk of similar controversies in the future).243
Finally, a stand-alone budget would highlight the relatively paltry amount of resources
allocated to the exempt organization function and disassociate that function from the
unpopular IRS and could lead to greater congressional appropriations.2 44
Funding can, however, be a double-edged sword. If the funding is done with
appropriations of general treasury funds, that may both invite political interference by
Congress and lead to instability. 24 5 Common alternatives for independent agencies are
dedicated funding from the regulated industry in one of two ways, either assessments of
the regulated industry-for example, dedicating the private foundation investment income
excise collections for the agency-or fees for services (such as the existing application
fee).246 The latter approaches can both create stability and protect the agency from political
interference, but are only available if Congress is willing to authorize them and thereby
surrender this means of influencing the agency.
Self-funding also may increase
presidential influence, particularly as exercised through the appointment process, as
compared to congressional influence.247
At the same time, such a departure may leave certain advantages behind. Even
with its battered reputation, a letter from the IRS has an in terrorem effect that a new agency
would be hard-pressed to duplicate. As part of the IRS, the exempt organization function
also receives support in numerous ways from other parts of the federal government that
would have to either remain available to the new agency or be transferred to it. 2 48 At first
glance, neither of these disadvantages appears particularly strong, however, especially
since maintaining existing support (e.g., IRS service center processing of forms, the
Department of Justice Tax Division's litigation support) or assuming it (e.g., hiring inhouse attorneys to provide legal support in place of IRS Chief Counsel) appears to be
achievable.
Certain restrictions would continue to apply, however, including civil service rules
and compensation levels that may inhibit the ability of the new agency to hire and retain
qualified personnel. 2 4 9 Similarly, procurement rules may limit the ability of the new
242 See Helge, supra note 97, at 25; Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63
DuKEL.J. 1717, 1733-35 (2014); Owens, supra note 58, at 5-7.
243 See supra note 1.
244 See JCT 2000 REPORT, supra note 23, at 120 (EO Division budget of $61.7 million in fiscal year
1999).
245
See ASHLEY C. BROWN, THE FUNDING OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES:

A
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REPORT TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF ANGULLA 7 (2008), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg

/Papers/AnguillaPUC.pdf [http://perma.cc/HM8P-R4ZQ]; Joel Seligman, Self-Fundingfor the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REv. 233, 253-54 (2004); Note, Independence, CongressionalWeakness,
and the Importance ofAppointment: The Impact of Combining BudgetaryAutonomy with Removal
Protection, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1822, 1825-29 (2012).
246 See BROWN, supra note 245, at 4, 8; Seligman, supra note 245, at 254-55.
247 See Note, supra note 245,
at 1839.
248 See supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
249 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 8, at 392; BROWN, supra note 245, at 13-14; Owens,
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58, at 5.

"THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR IS DISCRETION"

2016]

117

agency to obtain needed technology and outside expertise in the form of consultants.2 50
Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear to what extent Congress would fund any new
agency, particularly in these budget-conscious times. 2 51 Finally, careful consideration
would also have to be given regarding what portions of the Internal Revenue Code would
become subject to the interpretation and enforcement of the new agency and what portions
would remain with the IRS to minimize overlap and the resulting need for coordination.2 52
2.

Leaving the FederalGovernment

The type of SRO proposed by Owens is one that would have mandatory (as
opposed to voluntary) membership for all exempt (or at least charitable) organizations and
would wield implementation and enforcement authority (including the ability to impose
direct sanctions, unlike most private accrediting bodies). 253 The academic literature
relating to SROs indicates there are four threshold requirements for successful execution
of this type of SRO's regulatory role. First, the regulated community must support both
the creation of the SRO and regulation by that SRO in the public interest, including through
needed enforcement.254 Second, the SRO must be able to apply legally enforceable
sanctions to members of the regulated community who violate the applicable rules.255
Third, the SRO must be able to secure sufficient resources, both in terms of funding and
staff expertise, to fulfill its assigned role.256 Fourth, the government agency overseeing the
SRO must have sufficient resources, including expertise, and incentives to be effective as
257
an overseer.
The exempt organizations area appears to satisfy all four of these threshold
requirements. As already noted, exempt organizations, and particularly charities, generally
have a strong interest in regulation that promotes the public's interest in ensuring such
entities satisfy the legal requirements for the tax benefits they receive.258 By conditioning
tax exemption and, for charities, the ability to receive tax deductible contributions on being
a member in good standing of the SRO and giving the SRO authority to enforce in court
250 See BROWN, supra note 245, at 13-14.
251 See JCT 2000 REPORT, supra note 23, at 120 (EO Division budget of $61.7 million in fiscal year
1999); Joseph Bankman & Paul L. Caron, CaliforniaDreamin': Tax ScholarshipIn A Time ofFiscalCrisis,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 406-08 (2014).
252 See generally Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D, A
FrameworkFor EvaluatingAllocations Of GovernmentAuthority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19 (2014).
253 See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, PublicFunctions and the New Administrative Law, 52
ADMIN. L. REv. 813, 83 1-38 (2000); Douglas C. Michael, FederalAgency Use ofAudited Self-Regulation as
a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 174-81 (1995); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as
Community ofFate: Toward FinancialIndustry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 424 (2011); supra
notes 233-234 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Selfand Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 323 (2007); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry SelfRegulation:An InstitutionalPerspective, 19 L. & POL'Y 363, 391 (1997); Michael, supra note 253, at 192-93,
243-44; Omarova, supra note 253, at 446-47.
255
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note 253, at 243.
257 See, e.g., Michael, supra note 253, at 195; Derek Fischer, Note, Dodd-Frank's
Failure to
Address CFTC Oversight ofSelf-Regulatory OrganizationsRulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 69, 89-95
(2015).
258 See supra note 98 and accompanying
text.

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

118

[
[Vol.7:80

any sanctions imposed for violations of the applicable rules, Congress can satisfy the
second requirement. 259 Through the same mechanism, Congress can ensure that all
organizations enjoying these federal tax benefits provide financial support to the SRO,
which the SRO could use in turn to hire staff with the necessary expertise. 2 60 The federal
government currently collects from private foundations an amount that is two or more times
the IRS Exempt Organizations Division budget through a very modest (no more than two
percent) excise tax on investment income, so it should be an easy matter to construct a
sliding scale dues structure that provides sufficient financial resources without unduly
burdening the regulated community. 26 1 Finally, the IRS has spent decades developing
expertise in this area that could be deployed to provide the necessary government oversight.
Its still-healing scars from the latest exempt organizations oversight failure should also
provide sufficient incentive to provide adequate supervision of the SRO.262
That said, moving the exempt organization function entirely out of the federal
government to a self-regulatory body raises additional advantages and disadvantages,
while sharing some but not all of the advantages and disadvantages of a new federal agency.
The most important new advantage is the ability to generate financial support outside of
the federal budget process. 2 63 While some of the funding options discussed previously for
a new agency could make that agency's funding less vulnerable to political interference,
an SRO would have greater separation from the political branches.264 Another new
advantage is freedom from civil service rules, which would permit the SRO to pay higher
levels of compensation and more easily hire (and fire) employees than either the IRS or a
new federal agency.265 Unlike a federal agency, a sufficiently private body would not be
subject to constitutional restrictions on its activities or the Administrative Procedure Act,
giving it more flexibility. 2 6 6 At the same time, however, it is necessary to both limit
constitutional challenges and bolster the legitimacy of the SRO by providing some level of
due process and transparency. 267 Finally, a self-regulatory body with significant
involvement by nonprofit organization leaders may result in greater cooperation between
the regulator and the regulated community as well as greater regulated community buy-in,
participation, and compliance. 26 8 The reduced government involvement may also attract
more political support for strong oversight. 26 9
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With respect to disadvantages, an SRO would not be able to directly impose
criminal sanctions, but such sanctions are rarely used in the exempt organizations area and
could still be accessible indirectly through referrals to the IRS Criminal Investigation
Division.27 0 SROs also usually have a significant risk of inadequate oversight because of
capture by the regulated community (or dominant players within that community), a risk
that also exists with a separate federal agency but may be magnified with a private body
that has closer formal and informal ties to the regulated industry. 27' In this context,
however, the regulated industry leaders (and particularly prominent charities) likely are
more amenable to having a strong and effective regulator than normally is the case for
regulated communities because of their interest in the reputation of the exempt organization
272
sector.22
In fact, one potential risk of an SRO is that if it is dominated by the largest and
wealthiest tax-exempt organizations with a strong interest in preventing noncompliance, it
could create a risk of over regulation that would unduly burden smaller, poorer, and less
sophisticated organizations.273 For example, the move of the IRS toward regulating
governance, criticized in part because of the potential for ill-fitting one-size-fits-all rules,
could be accelerated in an SRO dominated by leaders of the largest and wealthiest
organizations (and encouraged by SRO officials seeking to increase their sphere of
authority).274 Such a risk could be mitigated by sufficient involvement of representatives
from smaller and less well-resourced exempt organizations and, as suggested by Owens,
by not giving the SRO the ability to impose rules that went beyond those necessary to
ensure compliance with the applicable federal tax laws. 275 Another potential disadvantage
is the reduced influence of the federal government and the public on the interpretation of
statutory provisions, possibly leading those interpretations to be less responsive to political
pressures than may be desirable.27 6 The IRS' role likely could be adjusted to address this
concern if it arose, however (as has happened with the SEC and the SROs it oversees).
It is also unclear as to what extent a private body, even one with close ties to the
federal government, could continue to benefit from various government support functions,
but it may be possible to still take advantage of at least some of that support, especially to
the degree it is essentially ministerial (e.g., processing filings). Finally, a new SRO might
also face a constitutional challenge to its authority. 277 That said, the constitutional
questions generally relate either to a lack of clear legislative approval, a lack of sufficient
270 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., IE-09-013, REVIEW OF THE
INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION'S NONPROFIT FRAUD REFERRAL PROCESS 6-8 (2010),

https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/201Oreports/2010IER006fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY3Y-CNAA].
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272 See supra note 98 and accompanying
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273 See Gabriel S. Mairzadeh, Self-Regulation ofInvestment Companies andAdvisers:
A Proven
Solution to a ContemporaryProblem, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 451, 507-08 (1997) (highlighting this issue
with respect to securities law SROs).
274 See Bonnie S. Brier et al., The AppropriateRole of the InternalRevenue
Service With Respect
To Tax-Exempt OrganizationGood GovernanceIssues, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND
GOV'T ENTITIES, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 43-44 (2008).
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See Owens, supra note 58, at 19-20; see also Mayer & Wilson, supra note 219, at 534-39

(recommending an enhanced state role in overseeing charity governance as opposed to a federal or selfregulatory approach).
276 See Michael, supra note 253,
at 190-91.
277 See generally Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The
Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1989); Alexander Volokh, The New PrivateRegulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, andAntitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
931 (2014).

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

120

[Vol.7:80

due process, or a lack of sufficient government oversight.278 It therefore should be possible
to properly construct an SRO and its processes such that it should survive any such
constitutional scrutiny.
An SRO therefore appears to be a viable option and most of the disadvantages of
leaving the federal government appear relatively minor in the context of the exempt
organization function. Furthermore, the advantages of leaving the federal government
appear significant, particularly with respect to the ability to access greater resources and
escape ill-fitting civil service and revenue-collection related rules.
There is, however, one important caveat. Most examples of national SROs
wielding substantial authority in cooperation with a federal agency occurred in situations
where the federal government was taking on a new regulatory responsibility and choose
from the beginning to house that responsibility primarily in one or more SROs.279 In
contrast, the regulation of exempt organizations through the federal tax laws is a
longstanding and relatively mature regulatory role. Moving that role to an SRO now could
therefore raise certain additional concerns. For example, the IRS has almost 900
employees currently dedicated to exempt organization matters, and some of the support
functions such as Chief Counsel also have a significant number of dedicated exempt
organization employees. 280 If the exempt organization function moved to a new federal
agency, it might reasonably be expected that many of those employees, and particularly the
ones with the greatest experience and expertise, could also be persuaded (or possibly
required if they wanted to remain employed by the government) to move to that agency.
Such an expectation seems less reasonable, however, if that function were to move to a
private body that does not offer the same level of job security or benefits (including union
211
representation) as a federal government position.
Particularly, given this concern, it is
far from clear how quickly a new SRO could staff up even with the aid of existing,
voluntary self-regulatory bodies such as Independent Sector, which in turn could lead to it
falling behind in the processing of the close to 90,000 applications and the hundreds of
thousands of returns filed annually, not to mention the dozens of current guidance projects
and other less formal education initiatives.282 While there are some existing organizations
that develop and promulgate best practices and in some instances even provide
certifications, none of them has developed to anywhere near the scale required to oversee
all exempt organizations (or even all charities). 28 3
It would also take a major educational effort to familiarize the over a million
existing exempt organizations, the millions of individuals who serve in leadership roles
with such groups, and the numerous professionals that advise those organizations with the
new regulatory structure. For example, despite years of effort to communicate with smaller
exempt organizations about the looming risk of automatic revocation, tens of thousands of
such organizations apparently missed the message.284 And because such a shift appears to
See Volokh, supra note 277, at 950, 960.
See Michael, supra note 253, at 203-240.
280 See JCT 2000 REPORT, supra note 23, at 117-19; supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
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[http://
278

279

perma.cc/D4R9-YC8B].
282 See supra Parts II.B. to II.D.; supra notes 229-230 and accompanying
text.
283 See, e.g., BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, http://www.give.org [http://perma.cc/J7MW-4Y9U];
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org [http://perma.cc/XN9F-QPXQ]; supra notes 229-230

and accompanying
text.
284

See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAx ADMIN., 2012-10-027, APPROPRIATE ACTIONS

WERE TAKEN TO IDENTIFY THOUSANDS OF ORGANIZATIONS WHOSE TAx-EXEMPT STATUS HAD BEEN

"THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR IS DISCRETION"

2016]

121

be unprecedented, there are almost certainly other transition issues that would not be
identified until after the transition was ongoing. These identified and unknown risks are
not necessarily fatal to the proposal to shift the exempt organization function to a private,
self-regulatory body, but they strongly suggest further thought and research needs to be
devoted to developing and planning for them before moving in this direction, as attractive
as it may otherwise appear.
There also are numerous implementation issues, some of which Owens addresses
in his proposal. 285 They include what functions would shift to the SRO with respect to
application processing, examinations and other compliance initiatives, rulemaking and
other guidance, and policy setting. They also include whether the functions should be
transferred over a period of time, both in order to better address the challenges of moving
a mature regulatory role out of the federal government and to permit systematic evaluation
of whether the transfer of each function has had positive results, and, if so, on what
timetable. Relatedly, Congress would need to determine the continuing role of the IRS and
the Treasury Department with respect to the transferred functions. Also, the above
discussion assumed there would be a single SRO (with a broadly representative board), but
it might make sense to instead have multiple SROs, each covering distinct types of exempt
organizations (e.g., schools, hospitals). Congress would also need to determine the extent
of the SRO's immunity from liability, both generally and with respect to antitrust laws
specifically. 286
Again, none of these questions necessarily raise fatal issues. They do, however,
indicate how complicated and difficult shifting regulation of exempt organizations from
the IRS to a non-governmental body likely would be. Nevertheless, the increasing failure
of IRS oversight detailed in Part II of this Article, the limited ability to improve that
oversight given likely available resources described in Part III, and the potential benefits
of moving the locus of exempt organization oversight to an SRO formed along the above
lines all support pursuing development of such an entity.
CONCLUSION
V.
The IRS oversight of exempt organizations with respect to their compliance with
applicable federal tax laws has reached a breaking point. Absent significant changes, the
public's confidence both in the ability of the IRS to provide such oversight and in the good
behavior of exempt organizations themselves will almost certainly continue to decline.
And that decline may soon reach a point, if it has not already, that threatens both the IRS's
ability to fulfill its primary, revenue-collecting responsibilities and the public support on
which most exempt organizations rely.
Even with its current resources and with no changes in the applicable substantive
law, there are several ways in which the IRS could improve its oversight of exempt
organizations. These ways include continuing to use streamlined application procedures,
increasing the efficiency of the examination process, ensuring greater disclosure of relevant
information, and expanding electronic filing requirements. Particularly if enacted together
and carefully evaluated and recalibrated as necessary to maximize their impact on
compliance, these methods have the potential to help the IRS do more with less.
(2012), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta
/auditreports/2012reports/201210027fr.html [https://perma.cc/R8HP-5VEA]; supra note 42 and
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accompanying text.

285 Owens, supra note 58, at 18-24; see also Helge, supra note 97,
at 70-79.
286 See Michael, supra note 253, at 198-203.
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But given the resource constraints faced by the IRS and the continuing growth of
the exempt organization sector, it is unlikely that these methods will be sufficient to attain
an acceptable level of oversight for exempt organizations. The time is therefore ripe to
consider bolder but riskier proposals to shift the oversight of exempt organizations outside
of the IRS. While a new federal agency has certain advantages, a new self-regulatory body
that operates under the close supervision of the IRS appears to be a significantly better
candidate for obtaining funding and freedom needed to substantially increase this oversight
and therefore compliance with the federal tax laws applicable to exempt organizations.
While the risks of moving this mature regulatory role out of the federal government are
substantial and not completely known, such that any such move would require careful
consideration of what functions would move out of the IRS, how such a transition would
be sequenced, and how it would be evaluated, it is time to pursue this option.

